The goal of this rubric is to filter and promote the recent scholarship on the Americas coming from the leading IR and Area Studies journals. The Regional Security Knowledge Hub team periodically refreshes the list, in winter, spring, summer and autumn. If you are interested in getting updates on the new content, please subscribe to our newsletter.



“S400s, sanctions and defiance: explaining Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy and the US response”, by Hüsna Taş Yetim, Ayşe Hazar, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 23 (1), 2023.

The United States Congress enacted CAATSA in 2017 to impose various restrictions on traditional rivals of the United States, which, however, was also imposed on a long-term strategic ally, Turkey. How can the application of sanctions designated for strategic rivals and enemies on an ally be explained? This article incorporates the hierarchy theory with Kai He’s negative balancing strategy notion, which provides a solid theoretical explanation for patron states’ punitive measures against their allies. We argue that CAATSA is part of the United States’ current negative balancing strategy, which aims to undermine the power of rising challengers, Russia and China, by preventing (Western) secondary states, including Turkey, from getting (nuclear) weapons from these two countries. In this context, the US used CAATSA sanctions to punish Turkey’s non-compliant and autonomous foreign policy behaviour when Russia and China rivalled the US-led order.

“Ukraine, Multipolarity and the Crisis of Grand Strategies”, by Alan Cafruny, Vassilis K. Fouskas, William D. E. Mallinson, Andrey Voynitsky, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 25 (1), 2023.

Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has unleashed the largest and most lethal war on the European continent since 1945. Vladimir Putin and the Russian government bear most of the responsibility for the invasion and its terrible humanitarian consequences. However, explanations for the war deriving from Russian domestic political dynamics or Vladimir Putin’s imperial nostalgia do not provide a comprehensive understanding of the crisis that led to war. Situating the crisis and ensuing invasion within the broader historical context of post-Cold War relations, we argue that the war in Ukraine has two main sources. The first is the longstanding Anglo-American grand strategy of NATO consolidation as a vehicle for political and economic domination in Europe. The second is the grand strategy of Russia. Unable to accommodate itself on an equal basis in the new U.S.-led post-Cold War global capitalist order, Russia gradually adopted a geopolitical and nationalistic agenda of confrontation in response to NATO’s seemingly inexorable eastward advance, its increasing participation in ‘out of area’ activities, and the United States’ illegal invasions of Serbia, Iraq, and Libya. The collision of these grand strategies has triggered simultaneously a struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty and independence and a U.S.-Russia proxy war.


“Organized Crime and Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence From Criminal Groups in Mexico”, by Ana Carolina Garriga, Brian J. Phillips, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 67 (9), 2023.

How does organized crime affect foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries? Some research examines the effects of crime, such as homicide rates, on FDI. However, we know little about how organized crime in particular might affect such investment. This paper examines organized crime and FDI in Mexican states between 2000 and 2018. This case is important because Mexico is one of the top global recipients of FDI. At the same time, criminal violence has killed hundreds of thousands of people in Mexico in recent years, and scholars seek to understand the violence’s wider effects. We explain how organized crime competition, as opposed to crime generally, should shape investors’ decisions. Analyses using original data on criminal organization territory find that higher numbers of criminal groups are associated with lower levels of new FDI. Other measures of crime, such as homicide rates or crime rates, are not associated with foreign investment.


“Remember Kabul? Reputation, strategic contexts, and American credibility after the Afghanistan withdrawal”, by D.G. Kim, Joshua Byun, Jiyoung Ko, Contemporary Security Policy, Published online: 05 Sep 2023.

We examine how a great power’s past behavior toward an informal security partner affects the broader credibility of its security commitments, focusing on the implications of America’s dramatic troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 as perceived by the U.S., South Korean, and Chinese publics. Against conventional wisdom, we show that knowledge about a great power’s decision to abandon an informal partner in one region of the globe can help increase confidence about its alliance commitments elsewhere. Our survey experiments identify a striking disjuncture: Although Americans tend to believe that the abandonment decision in Afghanistan will hurt their country’s credibility in East Asia, no such effect is found in South Korea and China. In fact, East Asian respondents who are reminded of the Afghanistan withdrawal become more confident about American security commitments when alerted to the possibility that this decision will help Washington to concentrate additional military capabilities in their region.


“Peace that antagonizes: Reading Colombia’s peace process as hegemonic crisis”, by Richard Georgi, Security Dialogue, Volume 54 (2), 2023.

This article explores how disruptive political conflicts evolve in peace processes by studying Colombian human rights defenders’ discourses about the peace process with the FARC-EP. While post-conflict scholarship has predominantly discussed violence and societal frictions as caused by legacies of war or flawed peace governance, I focus on the confrontations over political imaginaries that are endemic to peace processes. Through the lens of post-foundational discourse theory, I read the peace process as hegemonic crisis. This allows me to unpack the entanglement of political change and conflict, to which my discussions with human rights defenders allude: On the one hand, the peace agreement opened a political moment, in which it seemed possible to leave behind the hitherto hegemonic imaginary of the conflict as terrorism that had protracted the ‘state of war’; the advocacy for peace with social justice, on the other hand, it restaged historical confrontations with elites of the political right as antagonistic conflict over the meaning of peace. My analysis not only challenges the paradigm of war-to-peace transition, but also defines discursive conditions under which disruptive conflicts turn a peace process into an enduring interregnum, where the dawn of the post-conflict epoch is perpetually deferred and activist lives are threatened.


“Vaccine Diplomacy: How COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution in Latin America Increases Trust in Foreign Governments”, by Elena Barham, Sarah Zukerman Daly, Julian E. Gerez, John Marshall, Oscar Pocasangre, World Politics 75 (4), 2023.

Vaccine distribution in the Global South has created opportunities for vaccine-developing countries to improve their international reputations. Leveraging a panel survey conducted in early 2021, this article evaluates whether vaccine diplomacy affects trust in foreign governments in six Latin American countries. Among vaccinated respondents, trust in the government of the country that they believed developed their vaccine increased relative to trust in the governments of other foreign powers. Furthermore, providing information about the aggregate distribution of vaccines within a respondent’s country increased vaccine-eligible respondents’ trust in the governments of countries from which more vaccines were delivered. In each case, greater trust principally reflects updated perceptions of a common good motivation. The article’s empirical findings suggest that vaccine distribution—especially by China, but for other vaccine-developing countries as well—can cultivate favorable international public opinion. These favorable opinions may in turn facilitate great powers’ economic, political, or military foreign policy goals.


“The Ruling Group Survival: Why Pakistan and Hungary Move Away from the US-led Order?”, by Ali Balcı, Furkan Halit Yolcu, Foreign Policy Analysis, 19 (1), 2023.

Why do some smaller states signal to move away from the US-led liberal order? We look at the ruling group survival in smaller allies to answer this pressing puzzle. Despite accepting the merit of systemic explanations, we simply argue that the ruling groups in smaller states engage with revisionist powers in the international system to sustain and enhance their privileged positions in the domestic policy setting. Hungary, a NATO member, and Pakistan, a traditional ally of the United States, have long been showing signs of shifting toward the China/Russia axis. We explain the behavior of Hungary and Pakistan during the 2010s by focusing on the survival strategies of key ruling groups in those countries. We simply argue that relations of competing great powers with the ruling group in smaller states determine the fate of asymmetric alliance.


“Ontological (in)Security and the Iran Nuclear Deal—Explaining Instability in US Foreign Policy Interests”, by Morgan Thomas Rees, Foreign Policy Analysis, 19 (3), 2023.

On July 14, 2015, under the leadership of the Obama administration, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal—was signed. After 35 years of diplomatic isolation, the agreement marked a watershed moment in the United States–Iran relations and achieved a key US national security objective regarding nuclear non-proliferation. However, the agreement faced significant domestic opposition grounded in concerns that Iran was untrustworthy. Yet, the prospect of withdrawal generated a sense of insecurity that the United States’s status as a “responsible world leader” would be undermined, despite ongoing anxieties around Iran’s compliance. What explains such a paradox in foreign policy preferences? By incorporating discursive institutionalist approaches with ontological security perspectives, I work to show how President Obama’s entry into the agreement generated ontological insecurities as he struggled to displace existing narratives around Iran as a hostile, untrustworthy actor. Yet, Iran’s compliance with the agreement made it equally difficult for Trump to justify withdrawal; instead, his efforts raised additional concerns that America’s international standing would be undermined. Theoretically, this paper incorporates discursive institutionalist insights with ontological security to disaggregate how different conceptions of the “Self” are contested and activated in policy debates in ways that lead to instability and variation in US foreign policy.


“How Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy conflicts with ASEAN’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, by Shaun Narine, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 78 (1-2), 2023.

Despite giving lip service to the importance of respecting the “centrality” of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy (CIPS) conflicts with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Instead, Canada defines its position in the Indo-Pacific through the lens of American priorities and perspectives. For its part, the AOIP expresses an ASEAN consensus position but fails to capture the highly complex and varied views of different ASEAN states toward the US and China. The ASEAN states are status-quo powers navigating a region that is undergoing profound strategic and economic changes. By allying itself so firmly with the US, Canada participates in sowing tension in the Indo-Pacific and may face potential consequences in the longer term. CIPS allows little room for the complex regional relations that the ASEAN states are trying to balance.

“The AUKUS umbrella: Australia-US relations and strategic culture in the shadow of China’s rise”, by Lloyd Cox, Danny Cooper, Brendon O’Connor, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 78 (3), 2023.

In September 2021, Australia, the US, and the United Kingdom entered into a new trilateral security pact, AUKUS. Central to AUKUS is Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, scheduled to begin delivery in the 2030s. AUKUS was announced by Australia’s previous conservative government, but it has also won the strong support of the new Labor government. The rationale behind AUKUS emphasizes growing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and the advantages of joint capabilities and interoperability in the context of China’s growing assertiveness in the region. This article examines AUKUS through the lens of China’s rise and the contradictory economic and security imperatives that the agreement poses for Australia. We argue that AUKUS is the latest expression of Australia’s strategic culture, which is premised on a fear of abandonment and a conviction that Australia’s core security interests can only be guaranteed by the support of the US. Yet this position harbours risks that are not widely acknowledged. These include risks to Australia’s sovereignty and other risks arising from the uncertainties of the US position in Asia and the volatility of US domestic politics.


“AUKUS and India’s Indo-Pacific Strategy”, by Laxman Kumar Behera, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 78 (3), 2023.

The rollout of AUKUS represents a tectonic shift in the geopolitical rivalry between China and other Indo-Pacific nations. The coming together of three major democratic countries in a strategic technology pact to counter the authoritarian China in the Indo-Pacific could not have come at a more opportune time for India, which is facing increasing Chinese hostility on its northern land borders and strategic encirclement in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This article discusses AUKUS’s potential impacts on India and examines India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, its participation in the Quad, and its naval strategy. I argue that, on balance, AUKUS’s benefits for India far outweigh its costs.


“Bound to Lead: US-Taiwan Relations, Security Networks, and The Future of AUKUS”, by Christina Lai, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 78 (3), 2023.

In 2021 the US, UK, and Australia established a trilateral security partnership known as AUKUS. This new security arrangement carries strategic implications for Taiwan’s national security and prospects for regional order in Asia. It also leads to empirical puzzles: how will members of multiple alliances respond to rising threats? Under what conditions can a patron state avoid unwanted entrapment and imperial overstretch?
This article contributes to existing scholarship in US foreign policy and alliance management in Asia. It offers concrete thoughts on how a US policy of strategic clarity toward Taiwan and its contingency would enhance AUKUS’s resilience, while US allies in Asia and Europe could maintain a collective stance of strategic ambiguity that would lessen internal tensions among the member states. Such an arrangement could not only help stabilize Asia’s regional order, but also secure Taiwan’s autonomy against Beijing’s forced reunification.

“Strategic hedgers? Australia and Canada’s defence adaptation to the global power transition”, by Maxandre Fortier, Justin Massie, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 78 (3), 2023.

The intensification of rivalries between the US and China, and, in recent years, between the US and Russia, has deeply affected how middle powers relate to these great powers. Scholars have argued that middle powers are increasingly adopting “hedging” strategies to maximize their benefits and limit the consequences of the great power competition for their security and status. This paper revisits the concept of hedging and assesses whether two prominent US allies—Australia and Canada—have resorted to hedging in place of conventional alternatives like bandwagoning and balancing. The paper systematically compares Australia’s and Canada’s threat perceptions and defence policies to ascertain whether they have shifted their policies in the wake of the US’s relative decline. Since our study began, in 2008, we have found instances where the two allies resorted to hedging. However, evidence shows that when pressured to make a choice, Australia and Canada have closed ranks with the US against revisionist powers. Our paper suggests that threat perceptions play a fundamental role in this. Going forward, it would suggest that the US is in a stronger position than commonly assumed. As the competition between Washington and revisionist great powers increases, the former’s ability to build credible coalitions is expected to improve as it will rely on more dependable allies.



”Conflict management or conflict resolution: how do major powers conceive the role of the United Nations in peacebuilding?”, by Fanny Badache, Sara Hellmüller, Bilal Salaymeh, Contemporary Security Policy Volume 43, Issue 4, 2022.

This article examines how major powers conceive the role of the United Nations (UN) in peacebuilding. We conceptualize the UN’s role along the distinction between conflict management and conflict resolution and distinguish between the types of tasks and the approach the UN can adopt. We map states’ conceptions of the UN’s role in peacebuilding by coding peace-related speeches at the UN Security Council (1991–2020) delivered by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States as well as Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey as rising regional powers. Our findings show that states’ conceptions differ regarding the type of tasks the UN should do. However, the main fault line between the countries lie in the approach the UN should adopt to conduct peacebuilding tasks. We conclude that major powers see a role for the UN beyond mere conflict management as long as it is done with respect for national sovereignty.


”Narratives and War: Explaining the Length and End of U.S. Military Operations in Afghanistan”, by C. William Walldorf, Jr., International Security (2022) 47 (1), 2022.Why did the U.S. war in Afghanistan last so long, and why did it end? In contrast to conventional arguments about partisanship, geopolitics, and elite pressures, a new theory of war duration suggests that strategic narratives best answer these questions. The severity and frequency of attacks by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State across most of the 2000s and 2010s generated and sustained a robust collective narrative across the United States focused on combatting terrorism abroad. Audience costs of inaction generated by this narrative pushed President Barack Obama (2009) and President Donald Trump (2017) to not only sustain but increase troops in Afghanistan, against their better judgement. Strategic narratives also explain the end to the war. The defeat of the ISIS caliphate and a significant reduction in the number of attacks on liberal democratic states in the late 2010s caused the severity and frequency of traumatic events to fall below the threshold necessary to sustain a robust anti-terrorism narrative. As the narrative weakened, advocates for war in Afghanistan lost political salience, while those pressing retrenchment gained leverage over policy. Audience costs for inaction declined and President Joe Biden ended the war (2021). As President Biden seeks to rebalance U.S. commitments for an era of new strategic challenges, an active offshore counterterrorism program will be necessary to maintain this balance.  
”Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation”, by Wu Riqiang, International Security (2022) 46 (3). Winter 2021/22.China-U.S. inadvertent escalation has been a focus of recent international relations literature. The current debate, however, has not paid sufficient attention to two important factors: the survivability of China’s nuclear forces under unintentional conventional attacks; and China’s nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) system. Based on detailed analysis of these two variables, three potential mechanisms of China-U.S. inadvertent escalation are examined: use-it-or-lose-it, unauthorized/accidental, and damage-limitation. Although the possibility of a major China-U.S. conventional war inadvertently escalating to a nuclear level cannot be excluded, the risk is extremely low. China’s nuclear forces would survive U.S. inadvertent conventional attacks and, thus, are unlikely to be significantly undermined. Even though China’s NC3 system might be degraded during a conventional war with the United States, Chinese leadership would likely maintain minimum emergency communications with its nuclear forces. Moreover, China’s NC3 system is highly centralized, and it prioritizes “negative control,” which can help to prevent escalation. China’s nuclear retaliatory capability, although limited, could impede U.S. damage-limitation strikes to some extent. To keep the risk of inadvertent escalation low, both sides must take appropriate precautions and exercise self-restraint in their planning and operations.
”Principal consumer: President Biden’s approach to intelligence”, by James Lockhart, Christopher R Moran, International Affairs, Volume 98, Issue 2, March 2022.

This article assesses United States President Joe Biden’s approach to intelligence. It evaluates his evolving relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency and the rest of the intelligence community from the early 1970s, when he was elected to Congress, to the early 2020s, when he became the forty-sixth president of the United States. It concludes that, against the ever-changing context of international affairs, from the late Cold War to the global ‘war on terror’, Biden’s approach to intelligence has remained consistent and stable, showing, on the one hand, enthusiasm for the production of national intelligence, and, on the other, a marked uneasiness about paramilitary covert action and the militarization of intelligence. The discussion that follows speaks to a larger debate, dating to the 1940s and still ongoing, in the executive and legislative branches of government, concerning the purposes and proper use of intelligence. This will interest policy-makers, officials and lawmakers responsible for intelligence and oversight, researchers and practitioners in security and intelligence, and scholars of American foreign relations.

”Constructing nuclear responsibility in US–India relations’‘, by Sidra Hamidi, International Affairs, Volume 98, Issue 2, March 2022.

In 2005, the United States recognized India as a ‘responsible state with advanced nuclear technology’. How did India go from pariah to a legitimate nuclear state? This article historicizes the concept of nuclear responsibility to explain India’s shifting place in the nuclear regime. Existing perspectives view responsibility as a function of discrete state behaviors to the detriment of understanding the relationship between power and responsibility as a discourse. This article tracks the evolving discourse of early proliferators, such as the US, UK and France, who legitimated their possession of nuclear weapons by linking responsibility with deterrence. In its early nuclear history, India challenged these hegemonic perspectives but more recently adopted the deterrence model of responsibility to be granted recognition and legitimacy in the global nuclear regime. The article concludes that nuclear states’ success in linking deterrence with responsibility complicates the place of disarmament as an alternative nuclear responsibility discourse. Tying deterrence to responsibility reshaped the global order around the continual presence of nuclear weapons, narrowing moral agency and limiting a nuclear weapon-free future. Reclaiming responsibility will require moving beyond the typical state-centric politics of blame towards institutional and structural approaches to moral agency.

”Is US grand strategy dead? The political foundations of deep engagement after Donald Trump”, by Jeffrey A Friedman, International Affairs, Volume 98, Issue 4, July 2022.

International Relations scholars frequently warn that the American political system has become too fractured to sustain a coherent grand strategy. This perception generally rests on two premises: that President Donald Trump led an unprecedented assault on established principles of US foreign policy, and that Democrats and Republicans have become so polarized that they can no longer agree on a common vision for global leadership. By contrast, this article argues that the grand strategy of deep engagement retains robust bipartisan support. Even though President Trump rejected more expansive conceptions of liberal internationalism, his behaviour was largely consistent with deep engagement’s principles. Moreover, when Trump departed from deep engagement—as with questioning the US commitment to NATO—his actions did not reflect voters’ policy preferences. In fact, polling data indicate that public support for deep engagement is at least as strong today as it has been at any other point since the end of the Cold War. Altogether, the article thus demonstrates that the grand strategy of deep engagement is less embattled, and more politically viable, than the conventional wisdom suggests.

”How not to deal with a rising China: a US perspective”, by Joseph S. Nye, Jr, International Affairs, Volume 98, Issue 5, September 2022.

Will China displace the United States as the world’s leading power by the centenary of Communist rule in 2049? The outcome will depend on many unknowns including what the two countries do over the next three decades. US leaders are likely to rely on their mental maps of how the world works. The primary sources of their mental maps tend to come from historical analogies and from international relations theories. Both are highly imperfect representations of reality. Historical metaphors and analogies are rife in the debate over how to understand the current rise of China, but three are particularly salient: a Thucydides trap; a new Cold War; and 1914 sleepwalkers. This article discusses the merits and demerits of relying on each of these analogies in turn, and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of prior mental maps that guided US policy-makers during the post-Cold War era. Chinese elites expect to replace the US as the leading global power by 2049. How should the US respond? Two prevalent historical analogies are misleading: a Thucydides trap about power transition, and a new Cold War that ignores the three-dimensional nature of US–China interdependence. More promising is the cautionary narrative of sleepwalking into the First World War. A successful strategy must lay out conditions for a cooperative rivalry starting with a careful net assessment of power resources and the formulation of feasible goals.

Autumn 2021


Brazil’s strategic diplomacy for maritime security and safety, by Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau, Jorge Gomes do Cravo Barros, Contemporary Politics, published online 25 August 2021.

Abstract: Even though Brazil adopted new diplomatic priorities since 2019, the maritime security and safety agenda has remained rather stable under the Blue Amazon paradigm. We examine the global, regional, and domestic systems within which Brazil’s maritime security and safety are embedded. While Brazil has no regional enemies, the ‘2019 black August’ oil spill, polluting vast parts of the country’s coastline, may be considered a tipping point since it led Brazilian authorities to revisit how the issue is framed on the national agenda. Applying the strategic diplomacy policy framework, we suggest three entry points for Brasilia to navigate in the near future, including the nexi between maritime security and safety, international and regional cooperation efforts, and the governance of Antarctica. They are all inextricably connected and key to Brazilian diplomacy, economy and geopolitics.



Identity Management and Role Branding in Security Affairs: Alliance Building in Argentine Foreign Policy, by Cameron G Thies, Leslie E Wehner, Journal of Global Security Studies 6 (4): ogaa055, 2021. 

Abstract: This paper argues that states needing to engage in short-term strategic manipulation of their identity will often turn to branding strategies. Branding allows leaders the flexibility to adopt new roles or reimagine existing roles to fit with the current security environment. Drawing on insights from role theory, social identity, and branding, we develop a theoretical framework to understand how leaders innovate in roles. We apply this framework to two episodes of Argentine–US relations. The first case focuses on the Argentine role of active independent (1933–1945) despite US efforts to ascribe the faithful ally role. Only near the conclusion of the war did Perón transition to an ally partner role for strategic reasons and without much of a branding strategy. The second case is that of Argentina’s adoption of the faithful ally role with the United States accompanied by a strong branding strategy under President Menem beginning in 1989. While innovation in the first case was possible without branding (though short-lived), the second case shows a more substantive transformation in Argentina’s role set. Branding helps to carve out space in the role set for new roles that may compete with existing ones and ensure their successful adoption and enactment.


Latin American and Caribbean Regionalism during the Covid-19 Pandemic: Saved by Functionalism?, by Lorena Ruano, Natalia Saltalamacchia, The International Spectator 56 (2): 93–113, 2021.

Abstract: Covid-19 arrived in Latin America in a context of ideological polarisation among national governments and internal socio-political turmoil, which bode badly for its numerous and overlapping regional groupings. However, in a manner suggested by functionalist theories, some of them have “found refuge” in technical/expert cooperation and side-stepped political paralysis with different degrees of success. With institutions and previous experience in health issues, CARICOM and SICA had a significant role in the management of the pandemic, while CELAC revived by promoting technical cooperation. In contrast, MERCOSUR failed to overcome the political rift among its members, so technical cooperation occurred, yet remained limited.



Regional energy security goes South: Examining energy integration in South America, by Thauan Santos, Energy Research & Social Science 76, published online 6 May 2021.


Abstract: This article proposes to promote a regional approach to achieving energy security in South America. To this end, it first discusses the concept of energy security, concluding that it is a concept slippery, hard to define universally, because it is polysemic, multi-dimensional and context-dependent. Analyzing the South American case, initially focusing only on the Mercosur countries, we identify that there are different regional integration initiatives, such as the case of Itaipu Dam and GASBOL Pipeline, however the experiences are exclusively based on binational initiatives. Through an energy modeling called Open Source energy Modelling System using a new framework named South America Model Base (OSeMOSYS SAMBA), four scenarios are created with different levels of energy integration in the region. It is concluded that more integrated scenarios lead to a reduction in the need to increase installed capacity, as well as lower geographic and socio-environmental impacts, due to resource optimization and greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation.



The Militarization of Law Enforcement: Evidence from Latin America, by Gustavo A. Flores-Macías, Jessica Zarkin, Perspectives on Politics 19 (2): 519–538, 2021.

Abstract: What are the political consequences of militarizing law enforcement? Across the world, law enforcement has become increasingly militarized over the last three decades, with civilian police operating more like armed forces and soldiers replacing civilian police in law enforcement tasks. Scholarly, policy, and journalistic attention has mostly focused on the first type, but has neglected the study of three main areas toward which we seek to contribute: 1) the constabularization of the military—i.e., when the armed forces take on the responsibilities of civilian law enforcement agencies, 2) the extent to which this process has taken place outside of the United States, and 3) its political consequences. Toward this end, we unpack the concept of militarized law enforcement, develop theoretical expectations about its political consequences, take stock of militarization in Latin America, and evaluate whether expectations have played out in the region. We show that the distinction between civilian and military law enforcement typical of democratic regimes has been severely blurred in the region. Further, we argue that the constabularization of the military has had important consequences for the quality of democracy in the region by undermining citizen security, human rights, police reform, and the legal order.



Challenging the liberal order: the US hegemon as a revisionist power, by Steve Chan, International Affairs 97 (5): 1335–1352, 2021.

Abstract: Current discourse on International Relations conflates international order and the interstate distribution of power. Many studies fail to clarify the concept of international order or to provide systematic empirical analysis that compares states’ conduct in relation to this order. The prevailing tendency relies instead on rhetorical assertion or definitional fiat to attribute revisionist and status-quo motivations to different countries. For example, power-transition theory claims that rising states are typically revisionist, whereas established states are committed to the status quo. This article presents a contrarian view, arguing that the dominant or established state can be a revisionist. This state is not forever committed to those rules and institutions of international order that it has played a decisive role in fostering. Conversely, a rising state is not inevitably bent on challenging the order that has enabled its ascendance. Revisionism is thus not unique to a rising power; moreover, this state is not destined to be a challenger to international order and an instigator of systemic war as typically depicted in the current literature. I advance these propositions in the context of recent conduct by China and the US, suggesting that whereas China has become less revisionist over time (even while its power has increased), the US has become more so especially during the Trump administration. The major impetus challenging the liberal international order has come more from domestic sources in the West than from China.



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