REGIONAL SECURITY KNOWLEDGE HUB: MULTIREGIONAL

The goal of this rubric is to filter and promote the recent scholarship on the intersection of multiple regions coming from the leading IR and Area Studies journals. The Regional Security Knowledge Hub team periodically refreshes the list, in winter, spring, summer and autumn. If you are interested in getting updates on the new content, please subscribe to our newsletter.

2025

“Further Back to the Future: Neo-Royalism, the Trump Administration, and the Emerging International System,” by Stacie E. Goddard and Abraham Newman, International Organization, 79, no. S1 (2025): S12–25.

Abstract: With the Liberal International Order (LIO) in decline, scholars have focused increasingly on the possible return to a Westphalian great power system marked by sovereigntist claims and balancing among states. The actions of the Trump administration, however, raise a number of significant puzzles for such accounts—the US seems willing to sign deals with traditional adversaries including Russia and China, while targeting long-standing allies like Canada and Denmark. At the same time, transactional politics often serve narrow personalist interests rather than national objectives. In short, a Westphalian lens focused on states and sovereignty may generate intellectual blinders that misreads the emerging international order. To overcome these limitations, we propose an alternative account, which we label neo-royalism. The neo-royalist order centers on an international system structured by a small group of hyper elites, which we term cliques. Such cliques seek to legitimize their authority through appeals to their exceptionalism in order to generate durable material and status hierarchies based on the extraction of financial and cultural tributes. This short paper lays out the key elements of the neo-royalist order, differentiating it from the Westphalian and Liberal International Orders, and applies its insights to better grapple with the emerging system being promoted by the United States under Donald J. Trump. For policymakers and scholars, the neo-royalist approach clarifies recent events in US foreign policy. Theoretically, the field should take contending ideas of international order seriously, and establish a research agenda beyond a backward looking view to the Westphalian moment.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818325101057

“Global Climate Politics after the Return of President Trump,” by Jeff Colgan and Federica Genovese, International Organization, 79, no. S1 (2025): S88–102.

Abstract: The second Trump administration has disrupted global climate politics, turning the United States away from the clean energy and environmental policies of the Biden administration. Consequently, analytical attention is turning, inside and outside of the United States, to a family of concepts referred to as “Climate Realism” (CR), which favors long-run investments in technology and adaptation over near-term climate mitigation efforts. We critically engage with CR and argue that political science identifies four key features of climate politics that shed light on CR’s strengths and weaknesses, and which will persist even in the second Trump era. Despite CR’s flaws, we contend that its emergence in reaction to the second Trump administration highlights some important dimensions of climate politics that deserve greater attention going forward. We highlight three topics for research: the political and practical strategies of the anti-green coalition; the heterogeneity in viable national economic strategies; and the implications for IR of a turn away from meaningful climate mitigation in powerful nations.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081832510115X

“Cooptation in great power rivalries: A conceptual framework,” by Gadi Heimann, Andreas Kruck, Deganit Paikowsky, and Bernhard Zangl, Contemporary Security Policy, 46 (1): 8–36 (2025).

Abstract: After being rather moderate throughout the post-Cold War period, great power rivalries are gaining steam again. Yet, in contrast to past rivalries they are characterized by complex interdependencies which prompt the rivals to engage in order-building within and across rival “blocs.” We argue that this order-building is frequently done by means of “cooptation,” i.e., the trading of institutional privileges for order support. To prepare the conceptual ground for studying cooptation in great power rivalries, we conceptualize cooptation as a specific mode of cooperation and distinguish between four types: taming opposition, securing partners, seeking patronage, and wooing leaders. We demonstrate (1) how great power rivalry shapes cooptation in institutional orders; (2) that cooptation can exacerbate great power rivalry; and (3) that cooptation can tame great power rivalry under certain conditions. We thereby show that theories of cooptation, usually used to analyze domestic politics, help explain international order(ing) in great power rivalries.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2024.2430022

“Transactional peacemaking: Warmakers as peacemakers in the political marketplace of peace processes,” by Sara Hellmüller, Contemporary Security Policy, 46 (2): 312–42 (2025).

Abstract: World politics are changing with important implications for international peace processes. We argue that recent changes in world order have led to transactionalism becoming more pronounced in peace processes. This is because increased geopolitical competition often leads to a conflation of warmakers and peacemakers: States that provide military support to belligerents also engage in peacemaking. This renders peace processes political marketplaces with transactionalism as main modus operandi. Transactional peacemaking has three features: It prioritizes bilateral over multilateral approaches; is interest-based and exclusive rather than value-based and inclusive; and focuses on short-term deals instead of long-term outcomes. Drawing on over 70 interviews, we empirically demonstrate our argument with the peace processes in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. We conclude by discussing the consequences of transactionalism for the global peacemaking landscape. By providing a new conceptualization of an emerging phenomenon in contemporary peace processes, we contribute to the literature on changing peacemaking approaches.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2024.2448908

“The changing regional faces of peace: Toward a new multilateralism?,” by Louise Fawcett, Contemporary Security Policy, 46 (2): 372–401 (2025).

Abstract: The fast-changing face of multilateralism, and the roles and reputations of international organizations, have invited more serious reconsideration of different institutional types and the part they play in global ordering. Recent scholarly work offers multiple insights into formal and informal governance mechanisms, but the importance of regional groups and actors within the multilateral system remains under studied. This article contributes to the debate on global peace operations in a time of geopolitical change by focusing on the evolving roles of regional institutions in world politics. It tracks their activities over time showing how they have become an essential element in any global security architecture today. Yet, despite their expansion and growing visibility, their transformative potential remains neglected. In a world where existing multilateral institutions and their normative framings are increasingly contested, the role of regional powers and agencies should be placed at the forefront of contemporary security debates.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2025.2460130

“Large-state liability in alliance politics: Revisiting the quasi-US–Taiwan alliance in the Taiwan Strait,” by Chin-Hao Huang, Contemporary Security Policy, 46 (4): 1055–78 (2025).

Abstract: While it is typically the smaller state in alliance politics that is expected to entangle the larger power in an unwanted conflict, there are circumstances in which the opposite is true. That a large power can entangle its smaller allies in high-risk behavior belies the large ally’s role in an incipient conflict. This article outlines three conditions where the script is flipped in this way: A large power may inadvertently push its smaller peer to the brink of the precipice when there are diminishing credible threats, fading reassurances, and limited support for the large power among its other alliances. Using the examples of the United States and its alliances in Asia—in particular, with Taiwan—the analysis considers why the quasi-US–Taiwan alliance has achieved neither its intended effects of making Taiwan more secure nor deterring China’s assertiveness in the Taiwan Strait, and the broader implications for security in Asia.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2025.2500491

“Mutually assured disruption: Globalization, security, and the dangers of decoupling,” by Thomas J. Christensen, World Politics, 77 (75th Anniversary): 91-107 (2025).

Abstract: The evolution of transnational production in the Asia-Pacific over the past few decades has been a force for peace. Critics of globalization and proponents of US-China economic decoupling advocate policies that would not only harm the global economy but would increase the likelihood of military conflict. This article focuses on the national security benefits of US-China economic engagement and the regional economic integration of East Asia. Government interventions to protect national security and build more resilience in supply chains are needed but should be limited in scope so as to avoid fundamental damage to the complex economic interdependence that has fostered growth and helped to deter war.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2025.a954436

“Soft balancing in the regions: causes, characteristics and consequence,” by T V Paul , Kai He , Anders Wivel, International Affairs, 101 (1): 3-15 (2025).

Abstract: US decline and retrenchment is increasing the importance of regional dynamics across the international system. Over the past decade, International Relations scholars have described and conceptualized this development variously as ‘de-centred globalism’, a ‘multi-order world’, a ‘multiplex world’ or a multicultural ‘no one’s world’, but the links between the regional and global levels and the roles and functions of regional institutions in power politics continue to be poorly understood. This special section uses the analytical lens of soft balancing—that is, attempts at restraining a threatening power through diplomatic and institutional delegitimation—to explore these links. Soft balancing has been used extensively to understand developments at the great power level, but its focus on diplomatic and institutional strategies holds considerable potential for explaining how rising powers, middle powers and smaller states seek to navigate the emerging international order. Contributors to the section discuss developments in the Indo-Pacific, central Asia, Europe and BRICS to answer questions such as: what are the characteristics of soft balancing in the regions? How do regional actors apply different soft balancing strategies? When and under what conditions will soft balancing strategies be effective? What is their impact on regional and global orders? This introduction offers an overview of soft balancing in theory and practice and their relevance to the world’s regions.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae286

“Regional intergovernmental organizations and macropolitical boundary work,” by Bahar Rumelili, International Affairs, 101 (3): 821-840 (2025).

Abstract: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has thrown into the spotlight the significance of where and how regional intergovernmental organizations (RIOs) such as the European Union draw their macropolitical boundaries. This article develops the notion of macropolitical boundaries to synthesize extant literatures on RIOs and their external relations, and presents a conceptual framework to study how different types of macropolitical boundaries are (re)made through the practices of RIOs and non-member states. The article identifies three dimensions of variation in macropolitical boundaries that result from such boundary work: 1) malleability; 2) stratification; and 3) modality (where the boundary is constituted through bilateral or multilateral relations). Subsequently, it theorizes how the malleability, stratification and modality of macropolitical boundaries enable or inhibit the influence of RIOs on conflicts between member and non-member states and shape the relations between the conflict parties. The article illustrates these effects in two cases: the EU’s impact on the Cyprus conflict and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ impact on the South China Sea conflict. The article offers policy recommendations as to how RIOs can contribute to the amelioration of such conflicts between member and non-member states, or at least avoid their aggravation.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaf015

Abstract: The contribution proposes a novel theoretical synthesis, between recent Arctic scholarship drawing on English School concepts and ‘third wave’ constructivist norms research, to analyse the thematic ‘boundary practices’ prevailing in Arctic governance. Through the boundary concept, the article draws attention to the myriad of intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary institutions that are engaged in shaping practices linked to the ‘responsibility to freeze’, referring to efforts to mitigate the impact of climate change on the region’s communities as well as non-Arctic remote societies. Based on participant observation and policy and institutional document analyses generated between 2021 and 2023, the article argues that the ‘web’ of Arctic governance might undergo a reconfiguration. Having previously withstood the pressures of geopolitical crises originating outside the region, the governance web is now overshadowed by recent geopolitical developments, potentially triggering a recalibration of the political centre away from the Arctic Council and towards other forums. This would raise new questions of responsibility, accountability and authority, all of which may negatively affect marginalized decision-makers, such as Indigenous communities, that hold prominent roles in the current governance set-up. Going forward, although Arctic boundary work remains collaborative, fragmentation and associated multiple loyalties may limit the extent to which geopolitical fallout can be reconciled with tackling climate change.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaf018

“Disinformation, deterrence and the politics of attribution,” by Elsa Hedling, Hedvig Ördén, International Affairs, 101 (3): 967–986 (2025).

Abstract: This article unpacks the politics of disinformation attribution as deterrence. Research and policy on disinformation deterrence commonly draw on frameworks inspired by cyber deterrence to address the ‘attribution problem’, thereby overlooking the political aspects underpinning attribution strategies in liberal democracies. Addressing this gap and bringing together disinformation studies and the fourth wave of deterrence theory, the article examines how acts of attribution serve liberal states’ attempts at deterring foreign influence operations. In liberal states, disinformation as an external threat intersects with essential processes of public deliberation, and acts of attribution are charged with political risk. Introducing the concept of the ‘uncertainty loop’, the article demonstrates how the flow of uncertainty charges the decision-making situation in disinformation attribution. Drawing on three contemporary empirical cases—interference in the US presidential election of 2016, the Bundestag election in Germany in 2021 and the EU response to the COVID-19 ‘infodemic’ which erupted in 2020, the article illustrates how diverse strategies of attribution, non-attribution and diffused attribution have been navigated by governments. By laying bare the politics of disinformation attribution and advancing a conceptual apparatus for understanding its variations, the article expands current knowledge on disinformation deterrence and speaks to a broader International Relations literature on how deterrence strategies are mediated through political contexts.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaf012

“Rethinking and arresting Eurasian hegemony: the centrality of central Asia to Indo-Pacific strategies,” by Brendon J Cannon, Ash Rossiter, International Affairs, 101 (4): 1193–1212 (2025).

Abstract: Drawing on classical geopolitical theory, chiefly developed by Halford John Mackinder and Nicholas John Spykman, this article examines central Asia’s significance for China’s pursuit of Eurasian hegemony. Our theory-driven analysis suggests that de facto control of central Asia by China would provide several interlinking strategic advantages: aggregated critical resources, enhanced continental connectivity and, counterintuitively, seaward expansion options. The reconfiguration of the global distribution of power resulting from greater Chinese suzerainty in this region would, we argue, pose a distinct challenge to the US-led international order. While contemporary strategic discourse tends to focus on maritime competition in the Indo-Pacific, classical geopolitical theory underscores why continental power remains decisive. The prospect of a dominant power controlling the Eurasian heartland—long identified as a key geopolitical fulcrum—demands renewed attention from Indo-Pacific allies and partners. The enduring insights of Mackinder and Spykman remain crucial for understanding how control over Eurasia—particularly central Asia—can shift global power dynamics, restructure regional alignments and shape the strategic calculations of both hegemonic aspirants and their counterbalancing coalitions. By revisiting these foundational theories, this article highlights their continued relevance in assessing the evolving geopolitical contest over Eurasia and its implications for the international order.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaf064

“Measuring Arms: Introducing the Global Military Spending Dataset,” by Miriam Barnum, Christopher J. Fariss, Jonathan N. Markowitz and Gaea Morales, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 69 (2-3): 540-567 (2025).

Abstract: Military spending data measure key international relations concepts such as balancing, arms races, the distribution of power, and the severity of military burdens. Unfortunately, missing values and measurement error threaten the validity of existing findings. Addressing this challenge, we introduce the Global Military Spending Dataset (GMSD). GMSD collates new and existing expenditure variables from a comprehensive collection of sources, expands data coverage, and employs a latent variable model to estimate missing values and quantify measurement error. We validate the data and present new findings. First, correlations between economic surplus and military spending are currently higher than at any point in the last two-hundred years. Second, updating DiGiuseppe and Poast’s (2018) analysis, we find larger substantive effects. Specifically, we find that the (negative) effect of a democratically on military spending is three times larger, and the (positive) effect of an increase in GDP is five times larger than previously estimated.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241232964

“Shifting narratives? The EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific after the war in Ukraine,” by Gorana Grgić and Giulia Tercovich, Journal of European Integration, 47(1), 63–83 (2025).

Abstract: The EU’s release of its first Indo-Pacific strategy in 2021 was seen as a significant step in its growing geopolitical ambitions. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the consequent security crisis have suggested a shift in policymakers’ attention and a reordering of the EU’s strategic priorities. This article examines how the war in Ukraine has impacted the EU’s narrative and actions in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing on the literature on EU actorness, it seeks to determine whether the war has accelerated or decelerated the EU’s urgency to engage in the Indo-Pacific. It does so by looking at the evolution of the EU’s relations with ASEAN and Taiwan. The article includes textual analysis of strategic documents, policy pronouncements, and speeches from both before and after the war began in February 2022, providing insights into the evolution of the EU-Indo-Pacific cooperation and the EU’s growing role in the region.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2024.2361339

“Cyber Diplomacy through Official Public Attribution: Paving the Way for Global Norms,” by Gil Baram, International Studies Perspectives, 26(4), 391–411 (2025).

Abstract: International discussions on establishing and implementing norms for behavior in cyberspace have spanned over two decades. However, differences in what constitutes ‘acceptable conduct’ have hindered progress in forming these norms. In recent years, Western countries have adopted a strategy to signal what is considered unacceptable behavior by publicly attributing cyberattacks and intrusions. I argue that this act of official public attribution serves as a practice for countries to express their disapproval of inappropriate cyberspace behavior and condemnation and can cumulatively shape international practices, holding the attacking state accountable. I explore this by (1) analyzing new data from the European Repository of Cyber Incidents, which shows patterns of official public attributions for the years 2000–2023, providing exploratory directions and trends, and (2) examining the Iranian cyberattack against Albania in 2022 and its subsequent official public attributions as an illustrative case study. I demonstrate how repeated instances of official public attribution can contribute to the development of a common practice that signals dissatisfaction of a specific behavior. As state-sponsored cyberattacks and intrusions are on the rise, this practice could have an accumulative effect.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekae022

“Liminal Strategies in the Margins of International Politics: The State-Like Power of Non-State Greenland,” by Ulrik Pram Gad and Kristian Søby Kristensen, International Political Sociology, 19(1), olae045 (2025).

Abstract: A growing body of literature builds on the observation that power is relational and directs attention to the diplomacy of marginal and liminal subjects, implying that they harbor a potential to change the structures undergirding international politics. However, performances of state power routinely find other loci than diplomacy, and all states are more or less marginalized from the conceptual core of statehood. This article therefore offers a re-calibrated take on the liminal potential emanating from marginal subjects in international politics, broadening the analytical focus beyond classical diplomacy to wider discourses of international law, international security, and international economy. After introducing the notion of power as performative, the article conceptualizes the margins and what liminality adds in terms of a different temporality, developing transition, suspension, and hybridization to describe marginal strategies with a liminal potential for change. The article then analyzes how the Greenlandic non-state, as an exemplary case, works in the margins to empower itself internationally. In conclusion, Greenlandic political practice reveals how the spatio-temporal margins of international politics—the gaps in and between the three constitutive discourses of law, security, and economy—enable the wielding of Greenlandic power with liminal potential.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olae045

“The European Union’s Place in United States–China Strategic Competition: How Role Dynamics Drive Brussels Towards Washington,” by Sebastian Biba,  Journal of Common Market Studies, 63(1), 71-88 (2025).

Abstract: Against the backdrop of intensifying United States–China strategic competition, the European Union (EU) has recently changed course and moved closer to mirroring US rhetoric and action on China. Why has this happened, and how can it be best explained? In this article, it is argued that current role dynamics between the EU and the two rival great powers can help us understand the growing, albeit not full, EU–United States alignment on China. Role theory assumes that co-operation between actors intensifies when their roles become more compatible. Accordingly, it is shown that the EU has recently adjusted its role to be more closely aligned with the United States’ position. That is to say, the EU has reshaped its own role conception, whilst the bloc has likewise become more open to meeting US role expectations after EU–United States role-playing turned positive once again under President Joe Biden.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13605

“The geopolitics of the green transition and critical Strategic minerals,” by Andy Hira, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 80(2), 217-245 (2025).

Abstract: The world is slowly transitioning away from fossil fuels. Much attention has been placed on technological breakthroughs needed for the green transition, such as longer-lasting batteries to extend the standard electric vehicle (EV) range, and on domestic and global policy challenges that accompany emissions reductions. Green technologies primarily rely upon critical strategic minerals (CSM). This article posits that just as the drive to control petroleum resources has shaped the twentieth century and the early decades of the twenty-first, so too will CSM shape the geopolitics of the rest of this century. In this article, I introduce a realist political economy framework to examine how reliance on critical inputs, whether fossil fuels or CSM, follows similar geostrategic parameters. I discuss how the fossil fuels transition offers opportunities for countries to develop new green industries through securing key inputs needed to build a green economy. CSM have both economic and security dimensions, and we can already see geopolitical rivalry taking place around the control of key sources of CSM in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and by China around rare earths minerals.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020251332595

“Sino-Russian rapprochement after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” by Gaziza Shakhanova, The Pacific Review, 38(2), 203–230 (2025).

Abstract: The goal of the present article is to analyse if there was an observable change in the impact of Chinese normative power on Russia after the start of the war in Ukraine. The article finds that despite Russia’s growing dependence on China there have been no significant changes in the measure of success of Chinese normative power in Russian discourse. Russian officials refuse to copy Chinese initiatives and instead produce competitive initiatives of their own. At the same time the article observes a significant change in the perception of China among the Russian elites: while before the invasion they had a tendency to look down on China, after the invasion they portray China in a radically more positive manner.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2024.2368227

“Securing the ‘great white shield’? Climate change, Arctic security and the geopolitics of solar geoengineering,” by Nikolaj Kornbech, Olaf Corry and Duncan McLaren, Cooperation and Conflict, 60(2), 286-307 (2025).

Abstract: The Arctic has been identified by scientists as a relatively promising venue for controversial ‘solar geoengineering’ – technical schemes to reflect more sunlight to counteract global warming. Yet contemporary regional security dynamics and the relative (in)significance of climate concerns among the key Arctic states suggest a different conclusion. By systematically juxtaposing recently published schemes for Arctic geoengineering with Arctic security strategies published by the littoral Arctic states and China, we reveal and detail two conflicting security imaginaries. Geoengineering schemes scientifically securitise (and seek to maintain) the Arctic’s ‘great white shield’ to protect ‘global’ humanity against climate tipping points and invoke a past era of Arctic ‘exceptionality’ to suggest greater political feasibility for research interventions here. Meanwhile, state security imaginaries understand the contemporary Arctic as an increasingly contested region of considerable geopolitical peril and economic opportunity as temperatures rise. Alongside the entangled history of science with geopolitics in the region, this suggests that geoengineering schemes in the Arctic are unlikely to follow scientific visions, and unless co-opted into competitive, extractivist state security imaginaries, may prove entirely infeasible. Moreover, if the Arctic is the ‘best-case’ for geoengineering politics, this places a huge question mark over the feasibility of other, more global prospects.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367241269629

“What can European security architecture look like in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine?,” by Ondřej Ditrych and Martin Laryš, European Security, 34(1), 44–64 (2025).

Abstract: The paper outlines the most likely scenarios of the future European security architecture based on an analysis of several drivers, such as Russia’s leadership’s perception of Ukraine, the mindset of the Putinist elite, Russia’s state geopolitics, the domestic situation and prospects of a regime change in Russia, economic sanctions against Russia, energy and the export of Russia’s energy resources, and the positions of key Euratlantic actors. The current “unstable balance model” will remain the most likely scenario in case of a conservation of the situation on the Ukrainian battlefields. Since the concert model of security architecture entails a lack of a revisionist agenda among all the actors, the only reasonably probable security management upgrade is a “positive stable balance”. This scenario is conditioned on degrading Russia’s military capacity, Ukraine’s military advancements on the battlefields, a weakening of the Russian economy and maintaining the support for Ukraine in the EU and NATO.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2024.2347221

“Bridges across regions: the effects of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation on European security architectures,” by Gorana Grgić, International Politics, 62(5), 988-1001 (2025).

Abstract: This article examines the evolving landscape of European security cooperation with partners outside the Euro-Atlantic theater, focusing on the Indo-Pacific region. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European threat assessments prompted a re-evaluation of security policies, highlighting the importance of partnerships with like-minded countries. This shift has introduced complexities in European security dynamics, including updated bilateral engagements, novel minilateral formats, and some revisions to multilateral cooperation. This article critically assesses who, how, and in what way is organizing these new and updated security partnerships. Focusing on the phenomenon of cross-regional cooperation, the article examines fundamental questions related to the organization of European security. First, the article investigates the beneficiaries of European security initiatives (who benefits) and the extent to which European actors have a clear vision for such engagements. Namely, whether they have been acting as architects, bricoleurs, agnostics, or spoilers. It also examines the mechanisms employed to ensure security and identifies the threats targeted by these measures (how), particularly regarding collaboration among multiple revisionist states. Lastly, the article explores how existing and newly formed cooperation modes impact European security architecture (in what way), arguing that some contribute to the existing “shopping malls” and others to the “tree houses.”

Link: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00656-8

“Two decades of changing dependency on Russian gas in Central and Eastern Europe: strategies versus achievements,” by Csaba Weiner, Péter Kotek and Borbála Takácsné Tóth, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 33(2), 324–343 (2025).

Abstract: The Eastern enlargements of the EU increased the bloc’s dependency on Russian gas and contributed to a more cautious attitude towards these supplies. This paper assesses the Russian gas dependency of the 11 Central and East European new member states according to the ambition and execution of their national energy strategies and compares it to the gas dependency shifts in the old member states. Two composite indicators of gas dependency – one for supply and one for demand – based on nine individual indicators were used for this evaluation, calculated for 2004, 2019, and 2022. We find that the new member states mostly reduced gas dependency through supply-side measures, while old member states increased dependency through some combination of worsening supply- or demand-side situations until Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The behaviour of member states was influenced by different perceptions of vulnerability and a varying sense of threat in the pre-war period. The old member states did not perceive their Russian gas dependency as a significant risk, whereas the new member states viewed this as a high-risk factor. New gas infrastructure capacity has contributed to diversification from Russia, but reducing gas demand did not receive much attention before the invasion.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2024.2385978

“Alliance of Revisionists: A New Era for the Transatlantic Relationship,” by Sophia Besch and Tara Varma, Survival, 67(2), 451-479 (2025).

Abstract: The transatlantic alliance is changing. This article argues that Donald Trump’s second term, together with the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe, may usher in a new era of revisionist transatlanticism. Revisionists on both sides of the Atlantic have identified a common enemy in the liberal transnational elite, both in their own countries and in multilateral institutions like the European Union. Many of them are also sceptical of NATO and amenable to Russian demands. Notwithstanding the significant potential for conflict, both sides stand to benefit from cooperation. Together, they could work to renegotiate the values and interests that unify the United States and Europe, and, in the process, dismantle the European project.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2025.2481768

“The Enduring Sino–Russian Strategic Relations of Mutual Dependence—The Attribute of Military Cooperation,” by You Ji and Xiangning Wu, Journal of Contemporary China, 34(155), 819–840 (2025).

Abstract: Beijing’s relatively ambiguous response to the Ukraine War has tested how firm the Sino—Russian strategic partnership is. This article aims to decipher the endurance and complexity of Sino-Russian strategic relations by evaluating the nature and dynamics of Sino-Russian defense cooperation amid the worsening international environment against both countries. By examining two Sino-Russian Joint Exercises and analyzing their joint military patrols, exercises, and technological projects, this article argues that the general Sino-Russian military collaboration has been enhanced. Beijing and Moscow have gradually strengthened the combat orientation of their military cooperation to deter the perceived third-party threat, solidify their strategic partnership and against the challenges posed by conflicting interests in the overall bilateral interaction. Both Beijing and Moscow consistently remain vigilant against the risks of abandonment and entrapment, emphasizing the importance of maintaining strategic autonomy and refraining from formal alliances. However, they confront the worst-case scenario of being simultaneously dragged into two separate armed conflicts by a shared adversary. Therefore, align with their own national interests, the ability of Beijing and Moscow to achieve a delicate equilibrium between avoiding entrapment and preventing abandonment will determine the vitality and long-term trajectory of their strategic partnership.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2024.2342898

2024

“Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Chinese Public Support for War,” by Deniz Aksoy, Ted Enamorado, and Tony Zirui Yang, International Organization, 78 (2): 341–60 (2024).

Abstract: This study examines how the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent Western responses influence Chinese public opinion on the use of force. Using two original, preregistered online survey experiments, first in June 2022 and then in June 2023, we show that the Russian invasion is associated with a modest but statistically significant increase in Chinese support for using military force in international affairs in general and against Taiwan in particular. However, information on Western military measures aiding Ukraine curbs the modest impact of the invasion. Such information is especially effective in reducing support for an outright military invasion of Taiwan. Causal mediation analyses reveal that the Russian invasion influences public opinion by inducing optimism regarding military success and pessimism regarding peaceful resolution of the conflict. These findings suggest that foreign military aggression and subsequent international countermeasures can sway domestic public opinion on using military force.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818324000043

“Strategic Narratives and the Multilateral Governance of Cyberspace: The Cases of European Union, Russia, and India,” by André Barrinha and Rebecca Turner, Contemporary Security Policy, 45 (1): 72–109 (2024).

Abstract: The last few years have seen the emergence of a cybersecurity regime complex divided into specialized forums discussing different sub-issues. But how do the main actors in cyberspace make sense of its fragmented governance, and how does that translate to their broader strategic narratives? Furthermore, to what extent are these in line with the predominant macro-narratives in the cyber-domain? To answer these questions, this article explores the strategic narratives of the European Union, Russia, and India in two of these specialized forums: one related to responsible state behavior in cyberspace, the other to cyber-crime. Through the study of narrative fragments — a new approach to the study of strategic narratives in multilateral settings — it concludes that these actors largely include these two issues within their broader strategic narratives. This highlights the importance of cross-issue analysis in the study of multilateral arrangements, particularly in the context of emerging regime complexes.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2266906

“Authoritarian Multilateralism in the Global Cyber Regime Complex: The Double Transformation of an International Diplomatic Practice,” by Mark Raymond and Justin Sherman, Contemporary Security Policy, 45 (1): 110–40 (2024).

Abstract: Multilateralism is regarded as a constitutive feature of the contemporary liberal international order and is associated with liberal values. However, for twenty-five years, authoritarian states have advocated the expansion of multilateral governance modalities for cybersecurity issues while major consolidated democracies have often opposed them. We explain this puzzle by distinguishing an overlooked variant of authoritarian multilateralism from the better-understood liberal variant. A Russo-Chinese coalition has employed various strategies within and beyond the United Nations to facilitate the adoption of this authoritarian variant for key cyber-governance processes, to achieve both specific cybersecurity goals and broader aims in contesting the liberal international order. Liberal democracies oppose instantiating authoritarian multilateralism, but they have also altered their understanding of multilateralism to encompass more space for private and multistakeholder governance alongside it, leading to a double transformation of the practice of multilateralism. The article concludes by discussing the implications of our analysis for multilateralism.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809

“Regional Socialization and Disarmament Preferences: Explaining State Positions on the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” by Michal Onderco and Valerio Vignoli, Contemporary Security Policy, 45 (3): 525–54 (2024).

Abstract: We bring nuance to the understanding of cleavages among states over the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). We measure the positions of the participants to the 2022 and 2023 TPNW Meetings of State Parties, employing text-as-data approaches. Our results show that the participants can be placed along a single axis, roughly associated with whether they view nuclear disarmament in an “old” way as primarily a security problem or in a “new” way as a humanitarian and emancipatory issue. We find that membership in a nuclear weapon-free zone—particularly in Latin America and Africa—has a statistically significant effect on state positions. We therefore debunk the idea that parties to the nuclear ban treaty are a coherent single block. Our article provides a new, quantitative way of measuring the positions of states vis-à-vis the TPNW and contributes to the emerging scholarship on the treaty.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2024.2376416

“Perspective-Taking and Security Dilemma Thinking: Experimental Evidence from China and the United States,” by Joshua D. Kertzer, Ryan Brutger, and Kai Quek, World Politics, 76 (2): 334-378 (2024).

Abstract: One of the central challenges in China-US relations is the risk of a security dilemma between China and the United States, as each side carries out actions for what it perceives to be defensively motivated reasons, failing to realize how they are perceived by the other side. Yet how susceptible to the psychological biases that undergird the security dilemma are the Chinese and American publics? Can these biases’ deleterious effects be mitigated? The authors explore the microfoundations of the security dilemma, fielding parallel dyadic cross-national survey experiments in China and the United States. We find microlevel evidence consistent with the logic of the security dilemma in publics in both countries. We also find that international relations ( ir) scholars have overstated the palliative effects of perspective-taking, which can backfire in the face of perceived threats to actors’ identities and goals. The authors’ findings have important implications for the study of public opinion in China-US relations and perspective-taking in ir.

Link: https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2024.a924509

“Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order,” by G John Ikenberry, International Affairs, 100 (1): 121–138 (2024).

Abstract: Among the many impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the most consequential may be in pushing the world in the direction of Three Worlds—the global West, the global East and the global South. One is led by the United States and Europe, the second by China and Russia, and the third by an amorphous grouping of non-western developing nations. These Three Worlds are not blocs or coherent negotiating groups, but loose, constructed and evolving global factions. This article makes four arguments. First, the Three Worlds system has the makings of a fairly durable pattern of global order, shaping struggles over rules and institutions. Second, the Three Worlds system will encourage a ‘creative’ politics of global order-building. The global West and global East will have incentives to compete for the support and cooperation of the global South. Third, there are deep principles of world order that provide a foundation for the Three Worlds competition. Finally, if the global West is to remain at the center of world order in the decades ahead, it will need to accommodate both the global East and the global South, and adapt itself to a more pluralistic world. But in the competition with the global East for the support of the global South, it has the advantage. The global South’s critique of the global West is not that it offers the wrong pathway to modernity, but that it has not lived up to its principles or shared sufficiently the material fruits of liberal modernity.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad284

“Forever competition: the end-game of Sino–US rivalry,” by Dominic Tierney, International Affairs, 100 (1): 361–383 (2024).

Abstract: The United States has declared an era of strategic competition with China but how might this rivalry end—assuming a positive outcome for US interests? US policy-makers have chosen not to pick a favoured end state for strategic competition, hoping to maintain flexibility. However, the decision not to choose a termination point could make the rivalry more difficult to resolve. The ‘negativity bias’ in psychology means that threats tend to loom large, limiting the odds of ending strategic competition. This article applies the negativity bias to potential end-state scenarios—China’s accommodation of US interests, China’s democratization and China’s collapse—and shows that none of these scenarios will likely end strategic competition. A study of the resolution of US great power rivalries over the last two centuries suggests there is a high bar to end strategic competition. Washington should choose a favoured end-game for strategic competition and the best option is sustained Chinese reform or ‘accommodation plus’. The negativity bias may powerfully influence the course and resolution of the Sino-US rivalry, and it can also help to explain many wider behaviours in international relations.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad294

“‘BrOthers in Arms’: France, the Anglosphere and AUKUS,” by Jack Holland and Eglantine Staunton, International Affairs, 100 (2): 712–729 (2024).

Abstract: Important French foreign policy dyads, such as relations between France and the United Kingdom and France and the United States, have consistently been subject to empirical, historical and policy analysis. However, France’s relationship with the broader Anglosphere is rarely considered or conceptualized. This article theorizes France’s relationship with the Anglosphere at a pivotal historical juncture. The 2021 announcement of AUKUS, a security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US, spectacularly excluded France despite a shared proclivity to use military force in defence of liberal international order. To analyse this vital contemporary case, we undertake a comparative, computer-aided discourse analysis of 540 political and media texts, triangulated with thematic analysis of 37 elite interviews. First, contributing to constructivist and ontological security theory, we develop a novel theorization of alliance politics, generally, through the concept of ‘brOthers in arms’, whereby a double identity inscription binds allies antagonistically together. Second, contributing to critical studies of foreign policy and research on national identity, we locate France–Anglosphere relations, specifically, towards the thick end of an alliance identity spectrum, held together in mutual alterity by complementary, competing and co-constitutive exceptionalisms. Third, contributing to studies of foreign policy and alliance politics, our analysis situates AUKUS within the fractious longue durée of France–Anglosphere relations.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae016

“Do populists escalate international disputes?” by Sandra Destradi and Johannes Plagemann, International Affairs, 100 (5): 1919–1940 (2024).

Abstract: Among the potentially most consequential effects of populism is its impact on countries’ international conflict behaviour. However, empirical evidence about populists’ approach to international disputes is inconclusive. We develop a theoretical framework focused on mobilization and personalization, which we argue are particularly relevant characteristics of populist foreign policy-making. We hypothesize that, on a conflict–cooperation continuum, a country’s approach to a bilateral dispute will become more conflictive under a populist government if that dispute is strongly used for domestic political mobilization, and if decision-making on that issue is highly personalized. Conversely, foreign policy will not become more conflictive in cases of weak mobilization and personalization. We carry out in-depth qualitative within-case comparisons of non-populist and populist governments’ policies in Bolivia (2002–2019), India (2004–2022), and the Philippines (2010–2022), focusing on two selected bilateral disputes per country. Drawing on a broad range of sources, including 71 expert interviews conducted in the three countries, we find that populists in power escalate international disputes if they strongly use foreign policy issues for domestic mobilization and, at the same time, strongly personalize decision-making. This finding nuances existing assessments about the effect of populism on foreign policy change.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae172

“Why will China and Russia not form an alliance? The balance of beliefs in peacetime,” by Huiyun Feng and Kai He, International Affairs, 100 (5): 2089–2112 (2024).

Abstract: The ongoing war in Ukraine has thrust China–Russia relations into the global spotlight, with both nations asserting their stance against forming a military alliance. This article introduces a novel ‘balance-of-beliefs’ framework, positing that the foundation of peacetime alliances lies in leaders’ shared beliefs. Using operational code analysis, this study quantifies the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of leaders from the United States (Barack Obama), Australia (Tony Abbott), China (Xi Jinping) and Russia (Vladimir Putin) between 2013 and 2015, and includes additional comparison between Putin and Xi between 2016 and 2022. This research examines the essential role of aligned world-views on ‘the nature of the political universe’ (which we label a P-1 belief) and ‘the strategic approach to achieving political objectives’ (an I-1 belief). The findings reveal that such congruence is crucial for fostering like-minded alliances in peacetime, as evidenced by the US–Australia alliance. In contrast, the divergent P-1 beliefs of Xi and Putin hinder a Sino-Russian military alliance; yet, their aligned I-1 beliefs facilitate pragmatic cooperation on specific issues. This analysis underscores the need for US and European policy-makers to devise nuanced strategies in response to the evolving dynamics of a rising China and a resurgent Russia.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae184

“The future of UN peace operations: pragmatism, pluralism or statism?” by Roland Paris, International Affairs, 100 (5): 2153–2172 (2024).

Abstract: Although United Nations peace missions have played an important conflict management role for decades, a backlash against the post-Cold War model of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ and other recent developments have called their future into doubt. Some observers contend that a ‘pragmatic turn’ is now underway—a shift away from ambitious plans to transform war-torn societies into liberal democracies and towards more modest and realistic goals. Whether ‘pragmatism’ offers a viable alternative framework for peacebuilding, however, is less clear. This article challenges key assumptions of the pragmatic approach to peacebuilding, including the notion that UN missions can be ‘agnostic’ about the governance arrangements of societies that host these operations, as some proponents of pragmatism recommend. Historical case-studies show that such assumptions are integral features of collective conflict management systems, including UN peace missions. Moreover, a close examination of the pragmatist approach reveals that it, too, is based on such assumptions—namely, that building peace requires the promotion of pluralist societies and states. Pluralist peacebuilding, the article concludes, could offer a compelling foundation for future UN missions in an era of rising statist–authoritarianism, but developing this approach will first require discarding pragmatism’s pretence of ideological agnosticism.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae182

“The evolution of cyberconflict studies,” by Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Tobias Pulver and Max Smeets, International Affairs, 100 (6): 2317–2339 (2024).

Abstract: In our increasingly digital world, cyberconflict poses a significant challenge to global security, prompting the emergence of an academic field dedicated to its study. Understanding the trajectory, evolution and dominant characteristics of cyberconflict studies is vital for scholars and policy-makers alike. By means of a thorough analysis of articles from the 125 top political science and International Relations journals, we illuminate the field’s conceptual and methodological landscape. Our findings uncover a notable Europeanization of the field and a shift towards more rigorous methodologies, particularly experimental designs. While early research focused primarily on conceptual development and strategic topics, the contemporary field of studies exhibits a broader scope and greater diversity of scholarship. While the field has progressed beyond its nascent stages, it has yet to reach its full potential. We address several potential issues facing its growth and relevance. Firstly, there is a lack of global representation among researchers and in the incidents studied. Secondly, embracing interdisciplinary approaches is crucial for addressing newly emerging issues effectively. Thirdly, the diversification of research identities within the field of cyberconflict studies in the US and Europe must be bridged to foster collaboration and exchange of ideas. To overcome these challenges, adopting a pragmatic middle-ground approach is essential.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae175

“Memory-Political Deterrence: Shielding Collective Memory and Ontological Security through Dissuasion,” by Karl Gustafsson, Maria Mälksoo, International Studies Quarterly, 68 (1): sqae006 (2024).

Abstract: Traditionally used within the context of hard military power in interstate relations, the concept of deterrence has been progressively extended to non-state actors and new issue areas. While scholarship on the social aspects of deterrence has expanded our understanding of this core international security practice, the focus of existing research has largely remained on physical security. This article argues that there is a phenomenon in international politics that can be called memory-political deterrence. Memory-political deterrence refers to the ways in which states seek to dissuade other political actors from taking actions that threaten the collective memory narratives that underpin the ontological security of the deterring actor. Memory-political deterrence works, for example, through political rhetoric, declarations, diplomatic insults, commemorative practices, and punitive memory laws. We illustrate the article’s arguments through empirical examples from Russia’s and China’s recent memory-political deterrence efforts toward Ukraine and Japan, respectively. In doing so, we elucidate the ways in which memory politics is intertwined with geopolitics, underpinning wider world-ordering aspirations.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae006

2023

“Buffer zones and industrial rivalry: internal and external geographic separation mechanisms”, by Boaz Atzili, Min Jung Kim, International Affairs 99 (2): 645 – 665 (2023).

The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has led many commentators to remark that ‘geopolitics is back’. And with geopolitics, the interest in buffer zones is back as well. Yet, International Relations scholarship on buffer zones is confusing and outdated. Scholars disagree on the definition of buffer zones and whether such zones are a vestige of the great power politics of the past or a continuous phenomenon. In this article, we take three steps to reconceptualize buffer zones and their role in international relations. First, we clarify the conceptual confusion by advancing a new definition differentiating between nominal and active buffer zones. Second, we make the case that buffer states and internal buffer zones (i.e., geographic borderlands located within states in rivalry, adjacent to the international borders between the two rivals) share much in common and therefore should be analysed in tandem. Third, we offer a typology of buffer zones with short case-studies based on the dyadic relations of rival states vis-à-vis buffer zones between them. Our goal is to provide a new analytical framework that can serve as a base for a robust research agenda on the role of buffer zones in regional and international stability and security.

https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad028

“The Link between Libyan Civil War and the Eastern Mediterranean Issue in Turkish Foreign Policy: Balancing the Threat”, by Sami Kiraz, Bilig (104): 95-122 (2023).

This article aims to determine the main motivation behind Türkiye’s involvement in the Libyan Civil War as an active actor since 2019 which can be seen as a deviation from its traditional foreign policy. Türkiye has involved in the Libyan conflict following the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) which it believes threatens its vital interests in the region. In this study, this involvement is described in the context of Stephen M. Walt’s balance of threat theory. It is argued that Türkiye’s Libyan policy is essentially a balancing policy against the threat posed by the alliance against its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region. It is further argued that maintaining stability in Libya led by the Government of National Accord (GNA).

https://doi.org/10.12995/bilig.10404

“The War in Ukraine: Risks and Opportunities For the ‘Post-Soviet South”, by Emil A. Souleimanov, Yury Federov, Middle East Policy (30): 95-106 (2023).

The invasion of Ukraine sent shock waves through the South Caucasus and Central Asia, subjecting the eight countries of the post-Soviet area to economic, political, and social challenges. Refusing to support Russia in circumventing sanctions or taking a stand against the invasion could expose these countries to retaliatory measures. But aligning with Moscow could lead to international isolation and the imposition of secondary sanctions. This article explores the ways these countries are navigating the new geopolitics, with Azerbaijan gaining but Armenia seeking new allies. It then examines the economic benefits to these countries of Russia’s desperation, though this leaves them vulnerable to US and European penalties. It concludes with an analysis of how these states are dealing with the tensions caused by migration out of Russia. In all of these areas, the post-Soviet South must weigh the risks of aligning with the weakening great power or the West

https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12709

“Beyong ‘Vaccine Nationalism’: China’s Cooperation with the Middle East in the COVID-19 Vaccine”, by Niu Song, Wu Rui, China: An International Journal (21): 114-134 (2023).

The current COVID-19 pandemic has had a huge impact on global health security, and some developed countries have promoted “vaccine nationalism” based on the principle of self-interested supremacy and have adopted the approach of seizing pre-sale opportunities in the procurement of vaccines and competing for the right to distribute vaccines to obstruct fair and reasonable distribution of vaccines worldwide. This article analyses the current situation of and predicament caused by the pandemic in the Middle East which has to bear the brunt of the influence and detrimental impact of vaccine nationalism. By analysing the vaccine cooperation model and mechanism between China and countries in the Middle East, this article investigates how China’s vaccine cooperation in the Middle East has transcended vaccine nationalism. Vaccine nationalism has not only affected the availability of vaccines in countries in the Middle East but also threatened the health and safety of the region. The international vaccine cooperation between China and Middle Eastern countries is therefore an effective hedge against the negative impact of vaccine nationalism, highlighting China’s fundamental stance to safeguard the attributes of vaccines as public goods and also demonstrating to the international community China’s exemplary role in the fight against the pandemic.

10.1353/chn.2023.000

“Cyberware and the Weaponization of Information in US-China 21st-Century Geostrategic Rivalry”, by Er-Win Tan, Sofiya Sayankina, Pacific Focus (38): 180-209 (2023).

Sino–US geostrategic rivalry has carried over into cyberspace and is reflected in how both the United States and China view the internet as a battleground for the propagation of information warfare in their bids to increase global influence at the expense of the other. Both the United States and China have harnessed cyberspace in order to propagate their worldview to a global audience, whilst countering and rebutting the other’s information narrative. The flow of information – including the use of cyberspace to inject misinformation, deliberately biased reporting, cover-ups, and fabricated information – can be seen as a weapon of statecraft in pursuit of global influence and geostrategic objectives. Such ability to shape the information narrative marks a refinement of the use of propaganda, to the extent that private individuals with access to social media can be seen as propaganda tools.

https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12233

“Privatizing security and authoritarian adaptation in the Arab region since the 2010-2011 uprisings”, by Engy Moussa, Contemporary Security Policy 44 (3): 462-490 (2023).

Some Arab countries have since 2011 experienced intense security market diversification with considerable outsourcing of domestic security and guarding services. To date, scholars and security experts predominantly conceive this development within security reform processes or as an inevitable outcome of a chaotic post-uprisings period. Instead, this article situates some Arab states’ increasing reliance on private security actors within the evolving power dynamics and diverse challenges facing ruling elites and populations alike. Addressing how privatizing security contributes to perpetuating authoritarian practices post-2010, the article argues that contemporary security privatization and outsourcing provide alternative agents and strategies for control, while offering new venues to enrich and strengthen ruling elites. Guided by critical security studies and drawing on interviews, fieldwork and official documents, the article advances three ways through which outsourcing security supports practices of authoritarian adaptation: cultivating networks of patronage, diversifying ruling elites’ bases of security, and curbing constant sources of unrest.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2214757

“The limits of strategic partnerships: Implications for China’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war”, by Nien-Chung Chang-Liao, Contemporary Security Policy 44 (2): 226-247 (2023).

Will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bring China and Russia closer together or drive them farther apart, or will it be business as usual? This article addresses this question by conceptualizing the main characteristics of the China–Russia strategic partnership. It argues that a strategic partnership, characterized as it is by informality, equality, and inclusivity, is essentially different from an alliance or alignment. These characteristics allow Beijing to distance itself from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. This makes it unlikely that China will attempt any simultaneous aggression in East Asia or that it will be able to mediate in the conflict. This effectively rules out the rise of a China–Russia axis. As China strives to balance its close ties with Russia and its economic engagement with the West, Beijing is more likely to maintain, rather than strengthen or weaken, its strategic partnership with Moscow.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2174702

“Between EU candidacy and independent diplomacy: third country alignment with EU positions at the OSCE”, by Daniel Schade, Contemporary Security Policy 44 (1): 176-197: 176-197 (2022).

This article considers differentiated cooperation between European Union (EU) member states and third countries in diplomatic statements at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Using a novel dataset on interventions in OSCE Permanent Council meetings, it analyzes when and why third countries align with the EU’s positions. The observed alignment patterns underline the complexity of third country motivations to form part of the EU’s diplomatic alliances, such as their institutional proximity to the organization, or their own involvement in regional conflicts. In so doing the article explores the limits of differentiated diplomatic cooperation with the EU in multilateral security organizations. It also points to the constraints the EU faces when trying to establish itself as a relevant player in European and international security through diplomatic acceptance and amplification of its own views by others.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2148197

“Transnationally entangled (in)securities: The UAE, Turkey, and the Saharan political economy of danger”, by Eva Magdalena Stambøl, Tobias Berger, Security Dialogue 54 (5): 493-514 (2023).

Contemporary security interventions in Africa are characterized by an increasing pluralization of external actors, bringing with them new security rationalities, practices, and technologies, sometimes with profound influences on local security dynamics. While studies have focused empirically on East and South Africa, this article explores the roles of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey in the Sahel region of West Africa. To make sense of their engagement, we develop the notion of ‘transnational security entanglements’ by bringing the literature on (in)security assemblages into productive dialogue with scholarship on transnational entanglements in the fields of global history and law. Both literatures depart from relational ontologies, eschew methodological nationalism, and emphasize the interplay between the human and the non-human in the making of the social world. At the same time, we argue, the focus on entanglements adds a specific analytic of South–South connections and transregional circulations to extant scholarship on (in)security assemblages. To illustrate the importance of these transregional connections beyond the North Atlantic, we draw on interviews and media reports about the myriad ways in which connections between the UAE and Turkey with various actors in the Sahel shape current transformations of political orders in the region.

https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106231186942

“Principal-agent relations, politics of discretion, and the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security”, by Friedrich Plank, Journal of European Integration 45 (5): 767-783 (2023).

Interregionalism constitutes a main feature of EU external policy and unfolds specifically in Africa-EU-relations. However, research has merely focused on the EU as a coherent actor, although many EU institutions implement cooperation with African partners. Likewise, principal-agent research, a prominent path to unpack the internals of EU policies, on the EU´s interregional relations is nascent. This paper seeks to fill these research gaps by applying a principal-agent framework to internal processes of the EU in its Africa relations. After analyzing acts of delegation, it analyzes the discretion of the agents. Pointing specifically to the EU-Africa Partnership on Peace and Security, the study investigates on principal-agent relations from a non-principal-related perspective that puts forward structure-induced and interest-induced factors for increased agent discretion. The results suggest that agents enjoy substantial discretion enabled by the specific environment and agent actions in a policy field of high importance to the principals.

https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2177647

“The Ruling Group Survival: Why Pakistan and Hungary Move Away from The US-led Order?”, by Ali Balci and Furkan Halit Yolcu, Foreign Policy Analysis 19 (1), (2023).

Why do some smaller states signal to move away from the US-led liberal order? We look at the ruling group survival in smaller allies to answer this pressing puzzle. Despite accepting the merit of systemic explanations, we simply argue that the ruling groups in smaller states engage with revisionist powers in the international system to sustain and enhance their privileged positions in the domestic policy setting. Hungary, a NATO member, and Pakistan, a traditional ally of the United States, have long been showing signs of shifting toward the China/Russia axis. We explain the behavior of Hungary and Pakistan during the 2010s by focusing on the survival strategies of key ruling groups in those countries. We simply argue that relations of competing great powers with the ruling group in smaller states determine the fate of asymmetric alliance.

https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac026

“Inter-regionalism in the Global South: comparison with extra-, cross-, trans-, and pan- regionalism”, by Shintaro Hamanaka, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 36 (5): 697-719 (2021).

No region exists in isolation. Regions always have some external linkages. Existing studies on regions’ external relations often emphasise inter-regionalism, namely, a project to link two regionalism projects. The majority of these studies deals with the European Union’s (EU) ties with regionalism elsewhere. However, the EU is very unique, because its external policies are centralised in Brussels, and inter-regionalism naturally plays a dominant role in forming the region’s external relations. This study attempts to analyse inter-regionalism in a comparative manner, using the cases of cooperation projects across regions in the Global South. By looking into the web of cooperation projects across Southeast Asia and South Asia as well as that across Southern America and Southern Africa, this study examines whether inter-regionalism is a substitute or complement to other forms of cooperation including extra-, cross-, trans-, and pan-regionalism.

https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2021.1899135

2022

https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1983243 

“Prediction and Judgment: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War” by Avi Goldfarb, Jon R. Lindsay, International Security 46 (3): 7–50 (2022).

https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00425 

“How Much Risk Should the United States Run in the South China Sea?” by M. Taylor Fravel, Charles L. Glaser International Security 47 (2): 88–134 (2022).

Autumn 2021

“Pulled East. The rise of China, Europe and French security policy in the Asia-Pacific”, by Hugo Meijer, Journal of Strategic Studies, published online 7 September 2021.

Abstract: This article delivers the first post-Cold War history of how France – the European power with the largest political-military footprint in the Asia-Pacific – has responded to the national security challenges posed by the rise of China. Based upon a unique body of primary sources (80 interviews conducted in Europe, the Asia-Pacific and the United States; declassified archival documents; and leaked diplomatic cables), it shows that China’s growing assertiveness after 2009 (and national policymakers’ perceptions thereof) has been the key driver of change in French security policy in the region, pulling France strategically into the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, growing threat perceptions of China’s rise – coupled with steadily rising regional economic interests – have led Paris to forge a cohesive policy framework, the Indo-Pacific strategy, and to bolster the political-military dimension of its regional presence. By investigating this key yet neglected dimension of French and European security policies, and by leveraging a unique body of primary written and oral sources, this study fills an important gap in the scholarly literature on both European and Asia-Pacific security dynamics. The findings of this article also shed new light on the political and military assets that France can bring to bear in the formulation of a common EU security policy toward the Asia-Pacific and on the implications thereof for the prospect of a transatlantic strategy vis-à-vis China.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2021.1935251

“US Strategy and the Rise of Private Maritime Security”, by Jan Stockbruegger, Security Studies, published online 20 September 2021.

Abstract: What explains the rise of maritime private military security companies (PMSCs)? How do they differ from land-based PMSCs? I argue that PMSCs have become major providers of security at sea. Yet maritime PMSCs are not hired by states but by the maritime industry. The United States and allied forces do not guarantee merchant vessels’ day-to-day security. Consequently, shipowners rely on PMSCs and war and piracy insurance to operate their vessels in dangerous waters. The United States, however, plays a vital role in regulating PMSCs and creating environments in which PMSCs can operate effectively. This paper shows that order at sea depends not on the United States’ “hard” naval power but on its leadership in global governance and on its ability to create rules and norms for maritime behavior. It also shows that PMSCs can help secure the oceans if regulated and supported by state authorities. I illustrate this logic through three case studies of how the United States has facilitated private security efforts: during the Iran–Iraq Tanker War, in piracy-prone shipping lanes off Somalia, and in the Persian Gulf following attacks there in 2019.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.1976821

“Middle power hedging in the era of security/economic disconnect: Australia, Japan, and the ‘Special Strategic Partnership’”, by Thomas Wilkins, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, published online 19 October 2021.

Abstract: Deeping superpower rivalry between the United States and China has created acute strategic dilemmas for secondary powers in the Indo-Pacific such as Australia and Japan. This predicament is exacerbated by their divergent security and economic interests which cut across the superpower divide; a condition dubbed a ‘security/economic disconnect’. These two intimately related dynamics preclude clear-cut implementation of conventional balancing/bandwagoning alignment choices and have led to mixed hedging strategies to cope with this situation. To address these issues, the article presents a refinement of the hedging concept in International Relations (IR) that emphasizes its multi-dimensional nature, within a broader interpretation of alignment itself. It applies this to the case of the Australia and Japan with reference to their Strategic Partnership, which is both emblematic of hedging responses to systemic uncertainty, and an institutional mechanism through which to operationalize joint hedging policies. This provides insights into how middle power strategic partnerships are managing strategic risks across the security, economic, and other, domains.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcab023

“Climate Change and Security: Filling Remaining Gaps”, by Yasuko Kameyama, Yukari Takamura, Politics and Governance, 9 (4), published 22 October 2021.

Abstract: As perception of climate change as a threat to humanity and to ecosystems grows, the rapidly growing literature increasingly refers to the notion of “climate change and security,” for which there is as yet no single agreed definition. Despite the extent of literature already published, there are at least three remaining gaps: (1) Added theoretical value: How does “climate change and security” differ from similar notions such as “climate crisis” and “climate emergency”? What theoretical gains can be made by securing against climate change? (2) Role of non-state actors: The traditional concept of security is tightly bound to the notion of national security, but the climate change and security discourse opens the door to the participation of non-state actors such as the business sector, local government, and citizens. How do they take part in ensuring security? (3) Regional imbalance: Most of the literature on climate change and security published so far comes from Europe and North America. As other regions, such as Asia, are just as affected, more voices should be heard from those regions. This issue aims to address some of these gaps. The nine articles in this issue address the notion of “climate change and security” through empirical work while theoretically contributing to several themes relating to the climate change and security discourse.

Link: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.4932

“Varieties of organised hypocrisy: security privatisation in UN, EU, and NATO crisis management operations”, by Eugenio Cusumano, Oldrich Bures, European Security, published online 2 September 2021.

Abstract: International organisations (IOs) have increasingly resorted to private military and security companies (PMSCs) as providers of armed protection, training, intelligence, and logistics. In this article, we argue that IOs, seeking to reconcile conflicting international norms and member states’ growing unwillingness to provide the manpower required for effective crisis management, have decoupled their official policy on and actual use of PMSCs, thereby engaging in organised hypocrisy. Due to its stricter interpretation of norms like the state monopoly of violence, the United Nations (UN) has showcased a more glaring gap between talk and action than the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which display a more pragmatic, but not entirely consistent, approach to the use of PMSCs. By examining the decoupling between UN, EU, and NATO official contractor support doctrines and operational records, this article advances the debate on both security privatisation and organised hypocrisy.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2021.1972975

“What Shapes Taiwan-Related Legislation in U.S. Congress?”, by Gang Lin, Wenxing Zhou, Weixu Wu, Journal of Contemporary China, published online 30 September 2021.

Abstract: Through a quantitative analysis of Taiwan–related legislation between 1979 and 2020, the article finds that the degree of Taiwan–related legislation is significantly correlated with the degree of tension in U.S.—China relations. While a deteriorating cross–Taiwan Strait relationship is clearly associated with the increasing legislative activities for the sake of Taiwan, an improving relationship from the state of fair to good cannot guarantee a decrease of such activities. A unified government and the extent of the Taiwan lobby are both helpful in passing pro–Taiwan acts but statistically insignificant. A content analysis of pro–Taiwan bills approved by the Trump administration suggests a creeping movement to “normalize” U.S–Taiwan relations with congressional activism and the less-restrained White House as a co–engine.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2021.1985840

“China’s Health Silk Road in the Middle East and North Africa Amidst COVID-19 and a Contested World Order”, by Yahia H. Zoubir, Emilie Tran, Journal of Contemporary China, published online 21 August 2021.

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic has offered China a unique opportunity for worldwide deployment of its longstanding health diplomacy, renamed the Health Silk Road (HSR), now an integral part of its Belt and Road Initiative. As a self-proclaimed South-South collaborator and developer, Beijing has assumed a leadership role, grounded in ‘moral realism’, in the world’s health governance. Beijing’s health diplomacy has received acclaim in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, the pandemic has exacerbated preexisting tensions between China, the United States (US) and European Union (EU). Western countries, wary of China’s rising power, reacted resentfully, confirming underlying systemic rivalry. This article argues that the currently disputed, or shifting, world order accounts for the diametrically opposed reactions between the West and the MENA toward China’s Health Silk Road.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2021.1966894

“Reorganizing the Neighborhood? Power Shifts and Regional Security Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space and Latin America”, by Brigitte Weiffen, Andrea Gawrich, Vera Axyonova, Journal of Global Security Studies 6 (1): ogz080, 2021.

Abstract: The article explores how power shifts in world politics and the emergence of regional powers affect regional security governance. We identify the post-Soviet space and Latin America as two regions where a traditional hegemon and Cold War superpower (the United States and Russia, respectively) has recently been challenged by a rising power (Brazil and China). In both regions, an older regional organization shaped by Cold War dynamics exists alongside a newer organization shaped by the rising power. But do similar patterns of power shifts lead to analogous types and trajectories of security governance? We analyze four security organizations from the two regions: the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) from the post-Soviet space, and the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) from Latin America. We show how power shifts are reflected in (1) the factors driving organizational foundation and transformation, (2) the organizations’ security conceptions and practices, and (3) organizational overlap. Responding to the call for more studies in comparative regionalism, this article contributes to the debate on how powers of various kinds shape regions, regional organizations, and their security priorities, and adds new insights to research on overlapping regionalism.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz080

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