REGIONAL SECURITY KNOWLEDGE HUB: MIDDLE EAST

MIDDLE EAST

The goal of this rubric is to filter and promote the recent scholarship on the Middle East coming from the leading IR and Area Studies journals. The Regional Security Knowledge Hub team periodically refreshes the list, in winter, spring, summer and autumn. If you are interested in getting updates on the new content, please subscribe to our newsletter.

2025

“Geocultural Power in the Red Sea Region,” by Jan Bachmann, Bizusew Ashagrie, Ozan Kuyumcuoğlu and Isabell Schierenbeck, Foreign Policy Analysis, 21(2), orae039 (2025).

Abstract: In this research note, we argue that traditional geopolitical and geoeconomic arguments that seek to make sense of growing engagements between countries of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa often ascribe little significance to notions of culture and history that underpin the narratives of collaborations that have developed across the Red Sea. To address this shortcoming, we turn to the concept of geocultural power—understood as the mobilization of cultural and historical attributes, both symbolic and material, in the pursuit of foreign policy agendas—as a particularly useful heuristic for making sense of the wealth of historical and cultural claims invoked in foreign policymaking in the Red Sea region. We illustrate the utility of the concept through a short discussion of geocultural narratives related to Ethiopia’s shifting relations with the Gulf States and Turkey’s increasing engagement in the Horn of Africa. While the research note’s primary contribution is to outline a research agenda for using the lens of geocultural power, we also argue that states are not the sole arenas in which geopolitical claims are formulated. Hence, future studies should examine how geocultural claims encounter affirmation, contestation, and subversion in different societal arenas.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orae039

“Turkish foreign policy transformation in the context of middle power, strategic hedging and Eurasianism,” by Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 80(1), 23-44 (2025).

Abstract: Eurasianism came to the fore in Turkey after the coup attempt in 2016. Turkist/Turanist and Left/Kemalist versions of Eurasianism emphasize non-Western alternatives and push Western criticism of authoritarianism into the background. Amidst this process Turkey has sought to cooperate with Russia and China on a range of issues, particularly economic ones, and Ankara has also fronted the possibility of becoming a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The hedging strategy Turkey has pursued during the Ukraine crisis accounts for the fact that despite being a NATO member, having good relations with Russia opens up space for Ankara. In this respect, it can be argued that the Eurasianist steps seen after 2016 represent Turkey’s attempts at pragmatic hedging, which parallels its tensions with the West.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020251320897

“Transformation of Turkish-Russian Relations: Rivalry and Cooperation in Eurasia and the Levant,” by Mustafa Aydın, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 22(85), 21-39 (2025).

Abstract: Relations between Russia and Türkiye have developed considerably since the end of the Cold War. What began as energy trade in the late 1980s evolved into cooperation in business, energy, construction, tourism, politics and even security. Behind the ever-expanding cooperation lies a mistrust fueled by historical enmity and regional rivalry that occasionally leads to confrontation. As the two countries seek to shape their competitive cooperation beyond the current geopolitical challenges and constraints of regional security and alliances, the question of whether they could find ways to advance their partnership is of paramount importance and has regional and global implications. This paper seeks to understand how they have managed their conflict-ridden past to develop a modus operandi in the post-Cold War world by proposing a new conceptual model, namely “competitive cooperation” or “coopetition”, to understand the relationship that developed over the last 30 years in different geographical regions.

Link: https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.1621393

“Syrian Debates,” by Max Ajl, Middle East Critique, 34(4): 569–580 (2025).

Abstract: In 1990, at the dawn of post-Soviet intellectual structural adjustment, Prabhat Patnaik wondered, ‘Whatever Has Happened to Imperialism?’, elaborating on the silence of metropolitan Marxist discussion on this relationship within – or stage of – global capitalism (Patnaik 1990). Such a question can no longer be posed, as social science has again taken up the question of imperialism on a wide scale (Kadri 2023; Moyo, Yeros, and Jha 2012; Ossome 2024; Patnaik and Patnaik Ci2021; Valiani 2012). Yet within one geopolitical arena and its accompanying academic and professionalized fields, analysis of imperialism remains broadly sidelined: the Middle East (or the Arab–Iranian region). While the broader historical contentiousness around imperialism and South–North value transfers within Northern social science has a mechanical and essentially correct explanation, linked to the existence of an intellectual labor aristocracy, its relative monopoly over the means of cultural production, the social scientific inquiry into imperialism in the Arab–Iranian region seems to face unique issues related to suppressing discussion of surplus transfers and the political engineering required to maintain them.¹

This editorial, part of other work on gaps in scientific production on the region (Ajl 2021a, 2024a, 2024b), focuses on Syria and the role its absence plays within broader social-scientific debates around imperialism. The editorial explores the ‘mis-creation’ of the war in Syria as an object of knowledge in popular and academic social scientific production and contrasts it with documented reality concerning what occurred in Syria from 2006 to 2024. It returns to some older debates around Syria, proceeds to discuss state collapse and the destruction of sovereignty as a key aim of US imperialism, and shows how the umbra over Syria is paired with a broader penumbra over regional imperialism and resistance.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2025.2578776

“Nuclear Topsy Turvy: The Security-Economics Nexus in Turkish-American Relations,” by Eliza Gheorghe, Murat İplikçi, and Fatih Tokatlı, Middle Eastern Studies, 61(2): 267–87 (2025).

Abstract: This article discusses the shift in Turkey’s nuclear alliance with the United States from client to junior partner. Ankara sought to bring the Turkish economy and military forces in line with those of its patron to signal its loyalty. But power asymmetries made it so that Washington became Ankara’s lifeline. From the 1950s until the mid-1960s, American policymakers applied a top-down style of alliance management, making important decisions without consulting Ankara. But the mid-1960s marked a turning point in the nature of this relationship, as Turkey became better able to stand on its own feet. Rather than relying on unilateral measures, the Americans had to consult and coordinate with Ankara. Also, Turkey could reject key American proposals involving nuclear weapons, such as the creation of a Multilateral Force for NATO, and even create some ambiguity about its nuclear intentions to signal its loss of faith in the American security guarantee.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2024.2410357

“Israel and the Gulf Monarchies: A New Regional Security Complex or Just Complex Regional Security?” by Clive Jones, Middle Eastern Studies, 61 (3): 321–28 (2025).

Abstract: The Abraham Accords were viewed as a harbinger of a new regional order, indeed alliance, that looked to reshape security across much of the Middle East. The unprecedented attacks by Hamas on Israel on 7 October 2023, and Israel’s bloody retribution visited upon Palestinians in Gaza and parts of the West Bank are widely seen to have upended that process. This introduction and the subsequent articles look to challenge this assumption. By reimagining and developing the concept of a ‘Regional Security Complex’ this special issue critically examines the Abraham Accords as a fulcrum for regional change. While their promise might not be realised, they have proven more resilient than hitherto realised. They might not constitute the new regional security order, but they can shape its very contours.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2025.2455378

“The ‘villa in the jungle’ nuclear paradigm: Israel’s nuclear narrative and practice in a changing regional security complex,” by Ludovica Castelli, Middle Eastern Studies, 61 (3): 358–370 (2025).

Abastrct: The ‘villa in the jungle’ metaphor, conventionally associated with Israel’s former Defence Minister Ehud Barak, is one of the most referenced metaphors in Israeli political discourse. Its perpetuation has contributed to the fixation of two co-constitutive collective identities: Israel as an exemplary democratic society amidst a violent and backward Arab neighbourhood. This article examines an often-overlooked aspect of such a discourse: its transposition within Israel’s nuclear narrative and its impact on Israel’s nuclear politics. It contends that the perpetuation of this discourse has fuelled Israel’s nuclear orientalist narrative, fixing a paradigm according to which certain identities have crystallised as commonsensical and certain actions as legitimate. On one hand, it has helped to construct Israel’s entitlement to possess nuclear weapons and the Arab non-entitlement thereto. On the other hand, it has provided a rationale for Israel’s kinetic counterproliferation actions. However, the ‘villa in the jungle’ discourse and the identities constructed by it are anchored to a specific security context, which saw Israel as an isolated country facing an existential threat. But what if a change in the status quo, such as the emergence of a new regional security complex (RSC), devalued the ‘villa in the jungle’ paradigm and thus delegitimised both Israel’s nuclear orientalist discourse and practice? As Israel normalises its relations with Gulf monarchies and civilian nuclear programmes become increasingly salient in the region, for the first time since its creation, Israeli policymakers might find themselves entangled in a new dilemma, one centred on a re-assessment of the definition of ‘enemy state’ in Naor’s very first definition of the Begin Doctrine – or the ‘jungle’ in Barak’s definition.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2025.2455375

“Saudi Arabia’s US-China Hedging Strategy And Its Regional Impact,” by Xiaoyu Wang, Salman K. Al-Dhafeeire, and Degang Sun, Middle East Policy, 32(4):18–34 (2025).

Abstract: Since Mohammed bin Salman’s rise to power in 2015, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has transformed from security-driven to development-driven. This study analyzes how pressures from the international system and domestic factors have shaped the kingdom’s strategy toward China and the United States, and how this has affected its approach to the Israel-Iran rivalry and the Gaza war. Traditionally reliant on the US security umbrella, Riyadh has sought to recalibrate, diversifying security partnerships and advancing domestic defense capabilities under its Vision 2030. This zero-enemy strategy involves engaging simultaneously with Washington and Beijing on developing military technology and localizing defense production, thus maintaining equilibrium between the two superpowers. Such hedging ensures the kingdom’s autonomy to carry out regional diplomacy aimed at mitigating regional threats by shifting to dual reconciliations with Iran and Israel, as well as dual condemnations of Israel and Hamas. The article contends that this will help Riyadh mitigate risks and build a favorable environment for implementing Vision 2030.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.70027

Sari B., Kirişik A. “The Struggle for Syria: Strategic Rivalry and the Risks of Escalation,” by Buğra Sari and Avnihan Kirişik, Middle East Policy, 32(4): 51–66 (2025).

Abstract: This article investigates the rivalry between Turkey and Israel over Syria, which has intensified since the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The two states have pursued conflicting security objectives, becoming principal actors in Syria’s shifting political landscape. Ankara seeks to combat groups affiliated with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, build up a friendly regime in Damascus, and establish a lasting military presence. By contrast, Israel aims to secure its northern border by creating a buffer zone against the new Islamist government and targeting Iran-linked infrastructure. These conflicting strategies have raised the risk of proxy violence or even direct confrontation, especially in key areas like Quneitra, near the Golan Heights, and Druze-inhabited areas in Syria’s south. The study analyzes the military, diplomatic, and strategic dynamics between Turkey and Israel, highlighting points of tension and potential clashes. The study concludes by emphasizing the need for effective diplomatic mechanisms and proactive engagement to manage this growing rivalry and prevent further escalation.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.70012

“Saudi Arabia and Iran: Spoilers or Enablers of Conflict?” by Banafsheh Keynoush, Middle East Policy, 32(1): 38–53 (2025).

Abstract: Saudi Arabia and Iran played roles, inadvertently or not, in enabling the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel in October 2023. Before the war that ensued, Tehran aided and funded Hamas and its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Riyadh shunned the group by arresting and extraditing its members in a bid to join the US-backed Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel, a move that could lead to alliances to contain Iran. The Hamas assault thwarted the Saudi-Israeli normalization plans, at least in the short term, and gave Iran a chance to engage with the kingdom. The Islamic Republic urged Saudi Arabia to spoil the war by supporting a quick ceasefire, which could have enabled Hamas to regroup when Israeli forces advanced into Gaza. This article shows that the niche diplomacy to halt the fighting exposed the lurking rivalries and limited capabilities of Iran and Saudi Arabia. By not seeking a permanent solution to build peace or subvert the cyclical nature of the most enduring conflict in the Middle East, between Israel and Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Iran were sidelined by the United States when it built the first phase of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas by mid-January 2025.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12808

“The Gulf’s evolving security mosaic: balancing the manifest retrenchment and latent influence of the United States,” by David B. Roberts, International Affairs, 101(6): 2193–2214 (2025).

Abstract: The Gulf region’s security architecture appears to be undergoing a fundamental transformation. US military forces are gradually withdrawing, Gulf states are asserting unprecedented autonomy and competing powers are expanding their regional influence. Yet these visible shifts mask deeper continuities. This article examines this apparent paradox through a novel interdisciplinary framework that distinguishes between manifest indicators of change and latent mechanisms of persistent influence. While conventional analyses focus on visible metrics—military deployments, diplomatic realignments and formal agreements—this study reveals how technological dependencies, infrastructural networks and knowledge regimes perpetuate American influence despite apparent withdrawal. The analysis reveals three critical mechanisms sustaining US influence: ‘digital lock-in’ through software-dependent weapons systems, creating ‘weaponized interdependence’; persistent physical infrastructure networks providing operational access and surge capacity; and human capital development that embeds dominant western security paradigms. These mechanisms highlight the temporal asymmetry between rapidly shifting political alignments and the slower evolution of technological dependencies. Rather than witnessing a dramatic restructuring, the Gulf exhibits ‘residual hegemony’, where diminishing material presence coexists with enduring normative, technical and institutional legacies. This reconceptualization offers a more nuanced theoretical understanding of how regional security architectures evolve, suggesting that the most durable forms of influence may reside in socio-technical systems rather than in formal security arrangements. For policy-makers, this indicates that sustainable engagement increasingly depends on technical embeddedness rather than conventional military presence or diplomatic pronouncements.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaf183

“Transformative incrementalism: Palestinian women’s strategies of resistance and resilience amid gendered insecurity and neoliberal co-optation,” by Liyana Kayali, Security Dialogue 56(6): 777–795 (2025).

Abstract: Palestinian women have envisioned and enacted resistance and resilience in different ways throughout the long-running Palestinian resistance movement. Strategies have ranged from direct collective actions to the resolute maintenance of everyday life in the face of ongoing occupation, settler-colonialism, displacement and violence. Palestinian women in the occupied West Bank have begun to develop tactics that attempt to negotiate a widespread aversion to ‘illegitimate’ and aid donor-prescribed actions, as well as to the gendered risks with which politically active women must contend. While this approach once encompassed the principle of resilience, recent times have seen the growing rejection of neoliberal resilience narratives in the belief that they normalize and entrench an oppressive status quo. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the West Bank, this article explores how women’s search for legitimate and feasible modes of resistance and resilience has generated tactics characterized by incrementalism, but which form part of a transformative social change strategy. In so doing, it reveals the dynamic ways in which women constantly renegotiate resistance to violence in Palestine. It also demonstrates how development models based upon neoliberal understandings of resilience exacerbate gendered impacts of insecurity while eroding women’s capacities to withstand them.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106241226653

2024

Forward to the Past? Regional Repercussions of the Gaza War, by Morten Valbjørn, André Bank, and May Darwich, Middle East Policy 31 (3): 3-17 (2024).

The Evolution of the Gulf: History and Theories of a Complex Subregional System, by Hanau Santini and Paolo Wulzer, Middle East Policy 31 (1): 33-49 (2024).

Between the Superpowers: Gulf States and Israel Navigate the New Mideast Dynamics, by Gedaliah Afterman and Dominika Uhrová, Middle East Policy 31 (1): 133-148 (2024).

https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12731 

From East to East: Reconceptualization of NATO’s Eastern Flank Engagement in the Middle East, by Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz and Kristýna Pavlíčková, Journal of Balkan and Near East Studies 26 (1): 63-80 (2024).

The role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its influence on the peace and conflict dynamic in the Middle East has always been a discussed and controversial issue. While the United States and the countries of the NATO Southern flank are active in the discussions on NATO engagement in the region, the perspectives of NATO Eastern flank countries is often forgotten. This work contributes to the discussion with a comparative analysis of four NATO member states from Central and Eastern Europe: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and Poland. Their position is analysed based on their strategic interests and level of engagement in the Middle East, which leads to categorizing them within a created typology.

https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2023.2233276

 

The Middle East and the Ukraine War: Between Fear and Opportunity, by Jeffrey Mankoff, Middle East Policy 31 (2): 47-66 (2024).

Saudi Arabia’s ambivalent stance on the Russia-Ukraine war: Balancing regime stability and equal sovereignty, by Jens Heibach and Luíza Cerioli, Contemporary Security Policy 45 (4): 670-683 (2024).

UAE’s Balancing Strategy Between the United States and China, by Mohamed Bin Huwaidin, Middle East Policy 31 (1): 88-101 (2024).

Iran’s Strategies in Response To Changes in US-China Relations, by Sara Bazoobandi, Middle East Policy 31 (1): 120-132 (2024).

 

The Israel-Hamas war and the IDF strategy framework, by Jorge R. Kravetz, Israeli Affairs 30 (5): 879-892 (2024).

 

 

 

2023

 

“The Iraq War 20 years on: towards a new regional architecture”, by Louise Fawcett, International Affairs, 99 (2): 567–585 (2023).

To speak of a new regional architecture or order in Middle East beyond the Iraq War requires evidence of significant changes—a move from old to new alliances, relationships and patterns of behaviour.1 It does not require that architecture to be entirely stable or unified, but implies that any return to a prior order, like that of the Cold War or early post-Cold War period, is unlikely, if not impossible. As this article argues, even as the region continues to show volatility in the face of multiple challenges, there have been significant, irreversible changes linked directly to the consequences of the Iraq War. As simply stated by the British Iraq Inquiry in 2016: ‘The consequences of the invasion and of the conflict within Iraq which followed are still being felt in Iraq and the wider Middle East.’2 They are also visible in the shifting international alignments in a region now involving, albeit unequally, three major powers—the United States, Russia and China; in its balance of power, dominated by the Saudi–Iranian rivalry, to which other actors are obliged to accommodate themselves; and in its regional institutions, all of which show marked changes and new orientations.

https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad002

 

“Pathways to the Caliphate: Mapping Malaysian Foreign Fighter Networks in Iraq and Syria from 2012-2019”, by Rueben Dass, Jasminder Singh, Terrorism and Political Violence, 35 (7):1502-1535 (2023).

Utilizing social media profiles, court documents and media reports, this article analyzes the Malaysian foreign fighter networks in Iraq and Syria between 2012 and 2019. It is found that the Malaysian foreign fighter phenomenon is primarily driven by charismatic personalities, i.e., influential figures who were able to attract individuals into the Middle East. The attempted movement of fighters into Iraq and Syria can be divided into three phases corresponding to three personalities; the first led by Al Qaeda linked Yazid Sufaat, the second by Ajnad al-Sham linked Lotfi Ariffin and the third by Islamic State (IS) linked Muhammad Wanndy Mohd Jedi. Contrary to popular belief, the first wave of Malaysian militants had joined Syrian-based rebel groups like Ajnad al-Sham instead of IS with the shift occurring after Lotfi Ariffin’s death in September 2014. The three phases also highlight the shift in recruitment strategy from physical recruitment to the purely online sphere. A radicalization driver model of Malaysian fighters is proposed and it is argued that the two main factors that drove Malaysian fighters into the conflict zones are (1) External factors: charismatic personalities; romanticization of jihad; moral factors and ideological factors; and (2) Internal factors: discontent with the government.

https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2059352

 

“Oil and the Islamic State: Revisiting “Resource Wars” Arguments in Light of ISIS Operations and State-Making Attempts”, by Philippe Le Billon, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 46 (8): 1417-1439 (2023).

Debates over the relationship between natural resources and armed conflicts have flourished in the past two decades, but few studies have considered the case of oil and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. This paper reviews key scholarly arguments concerning the relationship between natural resources and armed groups, and examines the interrelationship between oil, armed conflict and ISIS. Building on this analysis, the paper offers insights into dilemmas of oil dependence for non-state armed groups controlling proto-states: specifically, while oil enabled ISIS to consolidate its attempts at establishing a de facto state, it also created vulnerabilities. Among these, U.S.-led forces deliberately targeted oil to deny ISIS’ attempts to achieve statehood, and to politically confine its status to that of a terrorist organization ruling over an oil rich and dangerous proto-state targeted for military and political eradication. These findings point to the value of nuanced analyses of relations between resource wars arguments and terrorism studies, as well as the need to more broadly consider the various political dimensions of natural resources in the study of armed conflicts and campaigns against terrorist organizations.

https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1846252

“Iran’s Security and the Islamic State through the Lenses of the Copenhagen School”, by Mahdieh Aghazadeh Khoei, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 46 (7): 1035-1041 (2023).

After the Cold War, a new generation of security studies emerged that moved debates beyond traditional, narrow, state-centric definitions of security toward considering other aspects like economic, political, social, and environmental contexts. This article evaluates one such contemporary important security concern—the threat of the Islamic State (IS), mainly against Iran, in the framework of the Copenhagen School security approach. The analysis concludes that IS threatens Iran’s security by increasing the possibility of Kurdish sectarianism, widening the Shi’ite–Sunni gap, creating economic threats, decreasing Iran’s influence in Syria, and challenging its power in the region. Analyzing Iran’s stance against IS and the ensuing security debate is important to predict the future of the Middle East.

https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1040293

 

“Quest for Regional Hegemony: The Politics of Ontological Insecurity in the Saudi–Iran Rivalry”, by Adısönmez, U. C., Onursal, R., & Öztığ, L. İ, Alternatives, 48 (1): 91-107 (2023).

The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been unfolding over a long period, influencing the politics and conflicts in the Middle East. The dynamics, content, and form of the rivalry have changed dramatically following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Sectarianism is frequently seen as the constitutive element of the conflict between the two countries. This paper brings a new light into the literature on the nature of the evolving Saudi–Iran rivalry. Specifically, it explains Saudi Arabia’s ideational balancing and threat perception against Iran by highlighting the ontological security narratives under which the Saudi–Iran rivalry evolves. In doing so, it draws on the fatwas (i.e., religious opinions), issued by Saudi scholars, as an empirical object of investigation, and explores how they constitute and reconstitute Saudi Arabia’s ontological security narratives. In this way, this work critically explains the ontological security regime in Saudi Arabia and the nature of the political struggle and antagonism between the two countries.

https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754221138186

 

“What Drove Syria Back into the Arab Fold?”, by Saban Kardas and Bulent Aras, Middle East Policy, 30 (3): 70-80 (2023).

After more than a decade of brutal civil war, which is still not resolved and has left Syria divided in thirds, regional states welcomed President Bashar al-Assad back into the fold in May 2023. The Arab League’s decision to reinstate Damascus’s membership was the culmination of a slow and fitful process that accelerated when Saudi Arabia took the lead. Still, it is too soon to know whether and how Syrian normalization will evolve beyond its Arab core, especially due to the West’s continued sanctions regime. This article analyzes how the evolution of the Syrian crisis, the changing calculus of Arab powers, and American inaction have contributed to Assad’s rehabilitation. In conclusion, we consider four areas that will determine the next phase of the normalization process.

https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12704

 

“The New (Dis)Order: The Evolving UAE-Israel Security Alliance”, by Tariq Dana, Journal of Palestine Studies, 52 (3): 62-68 (2023).

The normalization of relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel under the Abraham Accords is part of a long-standing security cooperation between the two regimes to monopolize regional power. Indeed, with the rapidly changing political and security landscape in the Arab world, the Abraham Accords have become central to understanding alliance formation in the region. The Accords have significantly enhanced the already existing security and military relations between Israel and the UAE, with heavy Emirati investment in advanced Israeli weapons systems and security technologies, military and intelligence sharing, as well as ­economic partnerships in strategic sectors. While the alliance is often portrayed as a defensive security arrangement aimed at countering the “Iranian threat,” a closer examination reveals that it is much more than that. Sponsored by the United States, the alliance entrenches Israeli settler colonialism and Arab authoritarianism as mutually inclusive pillars for the region, with the ultimate objective of reproducing US hegemony in the face of changing global dynamics.

https://doi.org/10.1080/0377919X.2023.2244868

 

“How do international borders affect conflict processes? Evidence from the end of Mandate Palestine”, by Richard J McAlexander, Journal of Peace Research, 60 (5): 823-838 (2023).

Rebels can comply with international law during a conflict by not violating international borders, yet strategic goals may incentivize rebels to violate these borders. When do international borders affect the spatial and temporal distribution of rebel activity in a conflict setting? I theorize rebels have an incentive to refrain from violating borders when doing so will reduce their international legitimacy. When international legitimacy is a less important goal, rebels will be more likely to violate borders. I test this claim in the context of the 1948 War in Mandate Palestine by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment in how the 1947 UN partition line was drawn. Using an original dataset on over 1,000 Palestinian villages from British colonial documents and an atlas of aerial photographs of Palestine, I use a geographic regression discontinuity design to see how the UN partition line affected the location and timing of depopulated villages during the war. The results show that villages in areas that the UN assigned to the future Israeli state as part of the 1947 partition plan were more likely to be conquered before Israel received recognition. These findings have important implications for understanding where and when rebels target areas and shed new light on important dynamics of the 1948 War in Palestine.

https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221088324

 

“Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Power Struggle over ‘Muslimness’: Reification, Securitization, and Identification”, by Jérémy Dieudonné, Middle East Critique (2023).

This paper questions the apparent hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia and highlights its discursive construction. It explores the centrality of ‘Muslimness’ in both countries’ discourses and how it both shapes and is shaped by their opposition. At the same time, it seeks to uncover how these discourses construct a specific regional and ‘Muslim’ dynamic. To do so, the paper draws on theories from both security and nationalism studies. The application of the theoretical framework was carried out over the 2010-2020 period through a discourse analysis of both primary and secondary sources. It is highlighted that Saudi Arabia resorts to a sectarian perspective, merging the ‘Muslim’ category with a ‘Sunni’ one, while Iran eludes the sectarian dimension and centers on the struggle against oppression and ‘arrogant powers.’ The paper concludes that, in the struggle over the definition of ‘Muslimness,’ both parties invest this label with different, but not opposing, attributes. While Saudi speeches express a closed and exclusive ‘identity’ defined by their understanding of religion and in direct opposition to Shias, Iranian speeches express an inclusive ‘identity’ based on ‘Muslimness,’ which is largely defined by the struggle against oppression.

https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2023.2270346

“The Hegemony of Resistance: Hezbollah and the Forging of a National-Popular Will in Lebanon”, by Abed Kanaaneh, Middle East Critique (2023).

Drawing on the Gramscian concept of hegemony, this article examines Hezbollah’s muqawama project within the Lebanese political arena. It provides a novel interpretation of Hezbollah’s political development from force operating through a ‘blitzkrieg’ strategy to hegemonic politics. It examines the role that the muqawama concept has played in shaping the organization’s changes in its latest phase, as well as its relationship with other political forces at the national and regional level. It concludes by developing a cultural analysis of Hezbollah’s video-clips and songs, showing how these embody the new nature of the muqawama project, and its various dimensions. President Aoun has always told those he meets that the United States and Israel only understand the logic of power, and that justice alone is not enough. While chatting with (MP Gebran) Bassil, Aoun said in front of everyone, ‘Our country did not pay all the prices it paid for the mistakes of others on its soil, except because of that saying—the curse—that Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness. What is happening today is our historical opportunity to correct it and say that Lebanon’s strength is in its strength.’ Strength is not only in the military resistance, which Aoun rightly appreciates, but also in political and diplomatic resistance: in saying no resoundingly to the demands of the US Secretary of State.

https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2023.2249344

2022

“The ‘New Great Game’ in the Eastern Mediterranean“, by Aylin G. Gürzel Aka, Aslıhan Engin Bozoglu, Isbandiyar Hashimov, and Afet Pulhan, Israel Affairs, 28 (1): 16-27 (2022).

This article examines the vicissitudes in regional affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean and their impact on the geopolitics of energy and geo-cultural realities. Framing the ‘logic of competition’ (energy market realities/geo-economics) and securitisation of energy politics by focusing on different scenarios, it explores the significance of international supply chains; the consequences of the emergence of Israel as a regional gas supplier superpower; Turkey’s uncertain position as an energy barrier or bridge; and the role played by multinational companies (MNCs), the so-called ‘new great gamers’. The scope of the game has expanded and spilled over from the Black Sea region to the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, Israel’s geopolitical approach is significant in the pursuit of wider economic and security interests.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2022.2017133

“The Israeli Navy vs. Hamas and Hezbollah“, by Ehud Eilam, Israel Affairs, 28 (1): 137-144 (2022).

The Israeli navy prepares to confront Arab non-state actors, mostly Hamas and Hezbollah. Hezbollah might attack Israel’s sea lanes in the Mediterranean Sea, while both Hamas and Hezbollah might strike Israel’s natural gas rigs and the Israeli coastline, where most of the Jewish state’s population and infrastructure are located. The Israeli navy will support ground forces by gathering intelligence and by striking targets. Yet, the Israeli navy does not have significant firepower so the IAF will assist in this matter. The Israeli navy also lacks the ability to conduct vast amphibious operations. The IDF can invest in this field since such a manoeuvre can be a game changer.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2022.2017147 

“Israeli-Iranian Relations: Past Friendship, Current Hostility“, by Marta Furlan, Israel Affairs, 28 (2): 170-183 (2022).

With decades of multilayered close cooperation transformed into outright hostility, Iran and Israel have been trying to strengthen their strategic posture vis-à-vis each other: Israel by attacking Iranian-related targets in Syria and befriending Arab countries; Iran by supporting armed militias and terror organisations and pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. While neither state seems interested in military confrontation, miscalculations can never be fully excluded.In the complex game of wars, peace agreements, and secret diplomacy characterising the Middle East over the past century it is particularly instructive to explore the dynamics between Israel and Iran. Over the past years, a series of developments have inflamed tensions between the Jewish state and the Islamic Republic: Iran’s unprecedented expansion across the region in general and its military entrenchment in Syria, in particular; the uncertainties, fears, and debates attending Tehran’s nuclear weapons program; the ascent of President Donald Trump to the White House and his fiercely anti-Iranian rhetoric and foreign policy that was welcomed and encouraged by the Israeli government; and the 2020 peace agreements between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. However, relations between Jerusalem and Tehran have not always followed this antagonistic course: there was a time when the two states were engaged in multifaceted political, economic, and security cooperation, among other fields. Yet this alliance, which sought to advance Israeli-Iranian interests in the face of an implacably hostile Arab world, was ended in one fell swoop in 1979 after the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic with its outright articulation of Israel’s destruction. In what follows, this article reviews the history of Israeli-Iranian relations, analyzes their current status, and attempts to assess their likely progress in the immediate future.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2022.2041304

“The Effects of Islamization on Muslim-Christian Relations Within Israel’s Arab Community Before and After the ‘Arab Spring’“, by Ilan Shdema, Ido Zelkovitz, and Moshe Sharabi, Israel Affairs, 28 (2): 208-231 (2022).

This article examines the effects of Islamisation processes among Israeli Muslim Arabs on their intercommunal relations with Christian Arabs before and after the ‘Arab Spring’, based on 45 in-depth interviews held prior to and after this momentous event. The findings show the complex role played by Islamisation in Muslim-Christian relations, causing tensions and distancing at times while promoting intercommunal cooperation on other instances. They also reveal that in addition to the Islamic Movement, three other main socio-religious subsets played a role in Islamisation: secular, traditional and Salafi. Finally, since the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’, the religious identity of Israeli Muslims has remained central but the power of Islamic segments seems to have declined. Under these circumstances, Muslims and Christians tended to grow socially distant from each other, though no substantial tensions were evident.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2022.2041314 

“The Munich massacre and the proliferation of counterterrorism special operation forces“, by Ronit Berger Hobson, and Ami Pedahzur, Israel Affairs 28 (4): 625-637 (2022).

The attack on members of the Israeli team during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, West Germany, was a critical juncture in the understanding of terrorism as theatre and in the fusion between counterterrorism and special operation forces. It created a path dependency in the way the terrorist threat is perceived and handled. For Israel, the attack was one in an ever increasing and constantly changing terrorist threat that helped shape its security apparatus and led to the proliferation of special operation forces units within the military, police and border police. Globally, the attack led to a spur in the establishment of special operation units with specific counterterrorism and hostage rescuing expertise. Overall, the media coverage of the Munich massacre and the failure of the German security forces in handling the crisis contributed to the survivability of special operation forces units. These units specialised in counterterrorism operations and later-on appropriated other types of missions and responsibilities while tightening their political ties and enhancing their public image. Most notably of these was the Israeli Sayeret Matkal. In recent decades, governments around the world have come to perceive terrorism as a military challenge. The war on terror that the United States and its allies declared in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks is the most prominent example of this perspective. Not surprisingly, the architects of the war on terror have placed Special Operations Forces (SOF), the most proficient combat military units of their respective armed forces, at the forefront of the campaign. Assuming a historical-institutionalist perspective, this article argues that the attack on the Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic Games was both an Israeli and a global critical juncture. It brought terrorism to the top of the agenda of policymakers around the world and framed it as a military threat. Moreover, in the absence of previous experience with such a phenomenon, let alone available units that specialise in hostage rescue missions, western countries adopted the model that Israel set several months earlier during the successful rescue of the passengers on board Sabena Flight 571. In the months following the Munich Massacre, many countries established special hostage rescue units within the armed forces, gendarmerie, or police. The remainder of this article will proceed as follows. It begins with the rise of media oriented international terrorism, and discusses the hijacking of Sabena Flight 571 and the rescue of the hostages by Sayeret Matkal. It then analyses the Munich Olympic Massacre and frames it as a critical juncture. It proceeds to discuss the rise of hostage rescue units in response to the Munich massacre and delves into the Israeli case in more detail to present the ever-expanding role of counterterrorism operations within the Israeli SOF community and the costs of this trajectory. The article concludes with a summary of the main theoretical and empirical lessons learned.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2022.2088134

“The Regional-Supremacy Trap: Disorder in the Middle East”, by Seyed Masoud Mousavi Shafaee, Vali Golmohammadi“Middle East Policy, 29 (1): 61-73 (2022).

This article analyzes the logic of recent instability and disorder in the Middle East. It offers two interrelated arguments. First, the region has turned into a battle zone in the aftermath of US retrenchment. The United States and other external powers refrained from direct engagement in shaping Middle Eastern order and, therefore, aspirant regional powers were prompted to redesign that order. Second, what makes instability and disorder a geopolitical feature of the Middle East is the “regional-supremacy trap,” the seduction of a power vacuum and a desire for regional hegemony, a trap that draws all influential actors into a series of endless and cumulative conflicts. According to our findings, there is a meaningful relationship between the instability and the regional power struggle for supremacy in the post-American Middle East. As there is no sign of cooperative mechanisms for shaping the regional order by the major Middle Eastern actors, the syndrome of disorder will continue for the foreseeable future.

https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12621

“Iran’s Water Security: An Emerging Challenge“, by Robert Czulda, Middle East Policy, 29 (2): 113-123 (2022).

Water and water management are no longer related to environmental studies. There is a very strong link between water and a state’s security, as well as its survival and development. A decline in water availability may lead to a collapse or even the extinction of a whole civilization. Sometimes referred to as a “water-bankrupt” state, Iran is a case that underlines the close relation between water and security, from the perspective of survival and opportunities for development. Without a doubt, the Islamic Republic of Iran is among those countries that are the most affected by climate change and low water levels. The main goal of this paper is to analyze challenges related to water in Iran, including the political, security, economic, and social dimensions.

https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12626

“Weaponizing Interdependence in the Middle East“, by Ariel I. Ahram, Middle East Policy, 29 (3): 43-47 (2022).

Global interdependence was supposed to herald a new age of peaceful cooperation. America’s global leadership in many ways derives from its ability to maintain, augment, and protect mutually advantageous interactions. Yet the United States has also tried to use its dominance in networks of finance, trade, and communications as a tool of coercion. No region has been more affected by such weaponized interdependence (WI) than the Middle East. But WI, enacted through various forms of direct and indirect sanctions and embargoes, has a spotty record of success. WI is typically coupled with military force and usually targeted against isolated and weak opponents. WI has contributed to several of the region’s gravest humanitarian crises, including Iraq in the 1990s and Yemen since 2014. This has cost the United States support from regional states and from the proverbial “street.” Moreover, targets often find ways to upgrade and deepen their repression as they adapt to network restrictions. The United States must be prudent in selecting targets for WI sanctions, broader in recruiting allies for its WI campaigns, and transparent about the humanitarian costs that WI imposes.

https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12646

“A Shared Vision: Security Convergence between the Gulf and Israel“, by Elham Fakhro and Tareq Baconi, Journal of Palestine Studies 51 (3): 50-55 (2022).

This essay provides an overview of the growing convergence of interests between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, the joint signatories to the 2020 Abraham Accords. It argues that the two Gulf states increasingly view Israel as an attractive model to emulate in terms of the management of internal dissent and external security. It details how both sides are seeking to develop a joint regional security architecture that mitigates their shared concerns around a possible return by the United States to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), as well as the Gulf states’ specific anxiety about a broader US drawdown in the region. The analysis highlights how this new framework built around a common securitized approach is also intended to further the objectives of the two Gulf monarchies to lead the course of regional affairs.

https://doi.org/10.1080/0377919X.2022.2090209

“Rethinking Armed Groups and Order: Syria and the Rise of Militiatocracies“, by Yaniv Voller, International Affairs, 98 (3): 853–871 (2022).

In recent years, the relations between weak central governments and armed groups in the periphery have attracted great attention. Rebels, warlords and other actors have not only undermined the authorities’ grip on power, but gradually come to shape the nature of governance and political system in their countries. Warlordism, rebelocracies and aliocracies are just a few of the political systems identified by students of conflict and armed groups. However, the literature has generally overlooked one category of armed groups and their implications on political order: pro-government militias (PGMs). As PGMs have become ubiquitous in civil wars, this article identifies a new political order emerging in countries where central governments have become reliant on PGMs in counter-insurgency operations. The article defines this order as a militiatocracy. Unlike armed groups in other political orders, PGMs do not seek to overthrow, undermine or replace the central government. Instead, in militiatocracies, PGMs and central governments develop symbiotic relations, which on the one hand help the government to survive an insurgency, but on the other allow militia leaders to secure an increasing presence in politics. The article illustrates the emergence and nature of militiatocracies by employing the case of Syria during the civil war.

https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac047

“UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East: A Twenty-First Century Review“, by Zachary Myers, and Walter Dorn, International Peacekeeping, 29 (3): 413-435 (2022).

While new ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping missions emerged at the end of the Cold War, more ‘traditional’ monitoring missions continue to operate. This work reviews the three current peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, with mandates to monitor buffer lines or zones between Israel and its previously warring neighbours: the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). We provide an overview of these three missions, their mandates, the circumstances from which they emerged and evolved. We then consider causal factors that have contributed to their effectiveness over the years and examine how such factors apply in the current state of these missions. Finally, noting that the region evolves and so must the missions, we offer recommendations for how they could remain effective into the future by investing in new technological capabilities and maintaining the integration between their analysis units.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2022.2053287

“Foreign sponsorship of pro-government militias fighting Syria’s insurgency: Whither proxy wars?“, by Reinoud Leenders, and Antonio Giustozzi, Mediterranean Politics, 27(5): 614-643 (2022).

Exploring the role of foreign-sponsored pro-government militias in counter-insurgency efforts, this article shows how the proxy war concept maps onto the Syrian conflict as we demonstrate both its contributions and limitations. Drawing on rare access to Syrian and foreign security actors inside Syria, we argue that the Syrian war, while rightly labelled a proxy war, sits uneasily with and at times even contradicts a set of scholarly assumptions and emphases on proxy wars when looked at from a counter-insurgency perspective. Accordingly, proxies were relevant not just as rebels but also as counter-insurgents. Sponsors included state and non-state actors alike, were manifold, and did not necessarily have exclusive relations to their proxies. They were also much more intensely involved with their proxies than generally expected from a war at arm’s length. Principal–agent relations this way ceased to be dyadic and hierarchical. What emerged was a heterarchical order, with parallel hierarchies tying proxies to their sponsors fiercely in competition with one another. This allowed and encouraged proxies to carve out leverage and agency of their own just as it fed into the Syrian regime’s resilience in averting a ‘double crisis of sovereignty’. Given the scale and success of its counter-insurgency efforts, the Syrian case calls for reconsidering proxy wars of the past while it may constitute a watershed development for how proxy wars are to be waged in the future.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1839235 

 

Autumn 2021

 

“Entrusted norms: security, trust, and betrayal in the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis”, by Vincent Charles Keating, Lucy M Abbott, European Journal of International Relations, published online 14 September 2021.

Abstract: Combining scholarship on norms and trust in International Relations, this article puts forward the concept of entrusted norms as a novel means to understand certain dynamics of cooperation and conflict in international politics. Entrusted norms differ from non-entrusted norms both in the manner that they are policed and in the reaction to their infringement. In the first case, there are few formal hedging mechanisms taken against potential defection. In the second case, when broken, they result in a betrayal reaction where a return to the behavioral status quo is insufficient to return to the political status quo. We illustrate the analytical usefulness of entrusted norms through an examination of the established norms of diplomacy within the Gulf Cooperation Council, paying particular attention to interactions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the post-Arab Spring period. We argue that the perception of Qatar’s defection from an entrusted norm, the preservation of individual and collective dignity, contributed to the 2014 diplomatic rupture between these two states and set in motion a betrayal/attempted reconciliation cycle, where even Qatar’s attempts to move back to the behavioral status quo prior to the fallout have been insufficient to fully repair the relationship. In addition to providing a novel interpretation to this case, this paper highlights the need for further theoretical consideration of the severity and duration of punishment after norm transgression within social constructivism, reinforces the theoretical connection between social structures and emotions, and advocates for an expansion in the domains of trust that we study.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211044197

“Desert Shield of the Republic? A Realist Case for Abandoning the Middle East”, by David Blagden, Patrick Porter, Security Studies 30 (1): 5–48, 2021.

Abstract: Political realists disagree on what America should “do” and “be” in the Middle East. All are skeptical toward extravagant geopolitical projects to transform the region. Yet they differ over whether hegemony in the Gulf and its wider environs are worth the substantial investment of blood and treasure. Hegemonic “primacy realism” finds the commitment effective and affordable, and that Washington should stay to stabilize the region to ensure a favorable concentration of power. There is an alternative “shield of the republic” realism, however, which views the pursuit of armed supremacy in the Middle East as harming political order at home, reducing security more than generating it, and costing too much for too little gain. It involves interests that are either manageable from a remove or largely generated by being there in the first place. In this article, we lay out the latter position, arguing that the unruly Gulf is increasingly peripheral to US national interests. The region is losing its salience grand strategically, entanglement and continuous war damage republican liberties, and the calculus of whether continued hegemony is “worth it” has shifted decisively toward the downside. The time for abandonment has come.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.1885727

“Europe and the ‘New’ Middle East: Geopolitical shifts and strategic choices”, by Silvia Colombo, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 23 (3): 403–422, 2021.

Abstract: The Middle East has witnessed major geopolitical shifts since 2011 that range from the growing influence of the Gulf states, the pivot to Africa of many of the region’s countries and the new dynamics of global penetration, to the proliferation of regional cleavages and intra-state conflicts, as well as more volatile alliances and rivalries. This article assesses the implications of those shifts for the European Union and its capacity to shape or adapt to new realities. In the past continuities have tended to prevail in the EU’s strategies, policies and toolbox vis-à-vis the region. The intensity of the transformations the Middle East is going through as well as their impact on Europe itself may oblige the EU to make a move now. Europe’s leverage and credibility are at stake.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2021.1888246

“China and New Middle East”, by Bingbing Wu, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 23 (3): 443–457, 2021.

Abstract: A New Middle East is emerging, which is shaped by the result of geo-strategic competitions in the region among key state actors. The power structure of the new Middle East can be summarized as a weakened and divided Arab world facing more powerful non-Arab actors, which has conditioned the emergence of three significant camps in the region. Major regional state actors and some sub-state armed actors are playing an increasing role in the geo-strategic competitions in the focal point countries of Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Libya. China has important interests in the Middle East, and key elements of its policy are taking shape. Institutional mechanisms of cooperation have been created and a network of partnerships with some regional countries has been established. The Belt and Road Initiative remains the key framework for China’s cooperation with the region.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2021.1888248

“Russia and the New Middle East”, by Leonid Issaev, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 23 (3): 423–442, 2021.

Abstract: Russian policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow’s actions in the region have began to acquire a less ideologically driving and more pragmatic character. However, the Arab Spring and conflict in Ukraine have underscored a more aggressive policy on the part of Russia, the quintessence of which was military intervention in an armed conflict far from its borders, in Syria. Largely Russian intervention to Syria was a tool for Kremlin to resolve internal problems, and a bargaining chip in relations with global and regional actors. At the same time the declining in public interest in foreign policy, as well as the high costs of military presence in the Middle East, in the short term will force the Kremlin to respond to demands from domestic audiences. The resolution of this problem will define the future of Russia in the MENA region. It will either be an ‘honest broker’ in regional conflicts, or have to be content with the role of ‘junior partner’ to Washington, Beijing or other actors.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2021.1888245

 

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