Regional Security Complexes – Middle East 2024-2025

Regional Security Complexes – Middle East 2024-2025

by Sara Terbec

Introduction

The well-established regional security complex of the Middle East (ME) has long been characterised by insecurity, marked by its long-standing historical rivalries and shifting alliances, as well as the actions of state and non-state actors, and profound enmity. Regional level of analysis in security studies offers the clearest conceptualisation of patterns of amity and enmity, historical legacies and mutual vulnerabilities that are primarily expressed in the form of clustered, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 45). Regional security complex theory (RSCT) is applied when analysing the regional level security dynamics, and in the case of the ME, it gives us a framework for the practical security analysis of the region’s security interdependence, the interplay of global powers and their piercing of the ME RSC. This ​Regional Security Monitor analysis examines the security landscape of the ME RSC during the period of 2024 to 2025. ​The analysis will delineate the key security actors of the region, how external and internal actors interact, contested regional roles, and explore the future security trajectory of the ME RSC.

 Middle East as a Regional Security Complex

The impact of historical legacies, including the patterns of amity and enmity, within the ME is integral to understanding its current security dynamics. Traditional fault lines and enduring rivalries continue to shape political and military strategies across the region, for example the Arab – Israeli conflict which can be considered the central axis of regional rivalry ​(Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 256), also the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia continues to drive actions of different regional actors ​(Gause, 2009, p. 5). This attribute was best shown at the end of the Cold War, when enmities between, for example, Israel and Syria, and Iraq and the Gulf Arab states continued without any major disruptions of relations even when the superpower rivalry that supported the enmities ceased to influence them (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 47).  

Spanning ideological, territorial, and sectarian divides, historical legacies lay the ground for the contemporary conflicts. The conflict between the Palestinians and Israel reaches as far back as the beginning of the 20^th century, which also influenced hostilities between Israel and the rest of the Arab states. Shared religious and cultural bonds, the unifying cause of Palestinian right to self-determination, which fuelled conflict with Israel, were the key factors that linked security dynamics across vast distances and enabled the formation of a single ME RSC, rather than leaving the region fragmented into several smaller complexes (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 191).  

The ME RSC is comprised of three subcomplexes – the Gulf, the Maghreb, and the Levant – which hold both state and nonstate actors, with Afghanistan and Turkey acting as insulator states. It is a standard complex, where security politics are defined by the relationship, or the pattern of rivalry, between the regional powers, and through that setting the terms for the penetration of the RSC by global powers (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 55). Alongside regional powers, violent non-state actors play an important role in the RSC long-standing conflicts ​(Valensi, 2015, p. 60) and can even be a symptom of it. Most notably, the Axis of Resistance, comprised of militant groups supported by Iran (e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen), perpetuate conflict ​(IISS, 2019, p. 32). 

Regional Security Dynamics in 2024–2025 

The highly securitised nature of ME RSC has been reinforced in recent years, where several major developments illustrate how securitisation processes and patterns of amity and enmity are shaping the region’s trajectory. ​​The most recent violent escalation in Gaza, which is a continuation of long-standing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, has been triggered by the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7^th 2023, and continues into 2025, causing widespread humanitarian devastation and regional escalation, spilling over into Lebanon, Syria and the Red Sea ​(International Crisis Group, 2023).​ The conflict has caused catastrophic humanitarian consequences, including mass displacement, infrastructure collapse, highly limited access to medical care, food aid and safe drinking water ​(OCHA, 2025), while spreading beyond the Gaza Strip with Israel simultaneously clashing in differing intensity with ​​Hezbollah, across the country of Lebanon. The US President Donald Trump’s  20-point Gaza peace plan from October 2025 provided a framework for a ceasefire followed by demilitarisation, hostage exchange, Gaza reconstruction and eventual recognition of Palestinian statehood (BBC, 2025). The Iran-backed militia exercises its predominant power, coordinating with Hamas and providing tactical support through which it impacts not only the war in Gaza but also the expansion of confrontation across the region (with the same practice, it asserted dominance in different regions of Syria), shaping the dynamic of the RSC ​(Jaber, 2025, p. 21).​

Furthermore, in a somewhat unexpected event in the middle of 2025, Iran found itself in a direct conflict with Israel, which was followed by the involvement of the United​​​ ​States in an effort to debilitate the Iranian nuclear program. The Iranian forward-defence strategy and projecting its power through proxies seems to be failing and leading to further escalation and risk, where possible paths of either restraining its proxies or involving itself more openly leave Iran less secure and weaken its capacity for regional control ​(International Crisis Group, 2023). In retaliation for the strikes, Iran announced it would fire missiles at a US military air base in Qatar, whereby in the end, the United States government asked Qatar to mediate a ceasefire with Iran (The Economist, ​​2025). The strikes have led to a significant breach in diplomatic talks, leaving little space for a new nuclear deal between the United States and Iran, as has been seen in the following months with Washington imposing new sanctions on Tehran (UPI, 2025). While there is fear of possible Iranian proliferation, its actual capabilities for it are questionable, it can be said that Iran possibly has more to gain from going back willingly to the nuclear deal negotiations, then entrenching itself in the conflict and waiting to see whether or not the US and Israel can translate military gains of the 12 Day war into political achievements where Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies get constrained, weakening the position of Iran and forcing them eventually into a less-favourable deal ​(Eisenstadt, 2025, pp. 50–1)​.

While the hostilities toward Israel have long been established, Iran has usually acted through its proxies in the region, like the Yemeni Houthis, who launched attacks in the Red Sea to pressure Israel to halt its Gaza campaign, a large scale military campaign that began in October 2023 and extended to 2025, period which was marked by sustained Israeli air and ground assaults, resulting in mass civilian displacement and causalities ​(Byman, 2024). In late 2024 and into 2025, Houthi attacks have intensified, with the group launching hundreds of missiles and drones towards Israel and targeting international shipping in the Red Sea, prompting Israeli airstrikes on Houthi-controlled ports and infrastructure in Yemen ​(Cohen, 2024). These attacks highlight how non-state actors influence the spread of conflicts to the regional level, with this escalation deepening the conflict in Gaza’s regional spillover and risking further destabilisation in Yemen. However, Saudi Arabia has maintained a de facto truce with the Houthis, reflecting Riyadh’s reluctance to risk new escalations that could threaten Gulf cities. It appears that Saudi Arabia and other powers of the Gulf are not eager to see further tensions arise in the ME, especially from the perspective that Iran may, ​in a strategy of deterring Israel,​ strike Dammam, Doha or Dubai, and not Tel Aviv (The Economist, 2025). Israel has also widened its operations, striking Syria amid sectarian unrest in mid-2025, raising fears of its hegemonic ambitions with U.S. backing (Yacoubian & Todman, 2025). 

The overlapping crises and emergence of new threats across traditional state boundaries illustrate the current structure of the RSC as defined by entrenched patterns of enmity. Israel faces hostility from most of the region, compounded by opposition to its repeated human rights violations, mass displacement of civilians and mass civilian casualties in the conflict in Gaza ​(UNHCR, 2024)​ and increasing displacement of Palestinians amid violent settler attacks in the West Bank ​(Human Rights Watch, 2024). On the other hand, Iran’s influence, traditionally exercised through proxies, has suffered setbacks due to the diminished capabilities of Hezbollah. In the case of Syria, Iranian influence has been on a downward trend, which Turkey has been able to capitalise on – balancing condemnation of Israel with covert coordination in Syria (Hamzawy, 2025).​​ At the same time, patterns of amity are fragile but present. The Abraham Accords have created new hubs of cooperation linking Israel with the Gulf states, Morocco, and Sudan. The Iran–Saudi rapprochement represents another attempt at reshaping the regional balance, lowering risks in battlegrounds like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (Habibi, 2025). Yet both forms of amity are fragile since Israel’s actions in Gaza have eroded public support for normalisation, therefore renewed clashes risk additional securitisation of Iran–Saudi ties. 

​​​Securitisation dominates the regional discourse, with Israel framing Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran as existential threats, justifying expansive military action. Iran securitises U.S. and Israeli interventions as imperial aggression, though its cautious retaliation in 2025 suggests pragmatic restraint. Additionally, the Gulf states securitise potential Iranian strikes on their cities, motivating their preference for diplomacy and truce with Houthis (The Economist, 2025). 

Desecuritisation efforts, however, are notable but fragile, as any localised conflict in the region can rapidly spill over and re-securitise relations elsewhere, reversing tentative moves toward cooperation. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has scaled back enthusiasm for normalisation with Israel due to strong domestic opposition and the perception that Israel refuses to pursue Palestinian self-determination (Jones, 2025).

Taken together, these dynamics sustain the Middle East as what Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 55) described as a standard conflict formation. Multiple overlapping crises ensure that insecurity in one part of the region quickly reverberates elsewhere. Non-state actors like Hezbollah and the Houthis blur the line between inter-state and sub-state conflicts, amplifying volatility. At the same time, shifting alliances and partial desecuritisation attempts indicate that the RSC is not static. The Iran–Saudi thaw suggests the potential for selective stabilisation in some arenas, while Israel’s growing isolation​​ shows how public opinion across the Arab world remains a structural constraint on normalisation, with citizen perception in several countries in the MENA region being below 13% in support of normalisation ​(Robbins, 2025). ​​Turkey’s manoeuvring demonstrates the flexibility of middle powers in exploiting shifting regional dynamics to expand their influence within the RSC, but its increasingly transactional and multi-vector diplomacy also carries significant risks; often middle power activism overextends its real capabilities and generates new vulnerabilities rather than sustainable influence ​(Kutlay & Öniş, 2021, pp. 12–4). This activism is rooted in a domestic–international feedback loop, in which assertive foreign policy compensates for internal political and economic pressures, leading to oscillations between bold independent behaviour and forced pragmatic restraint, having to pull back when its limits become clear. Ultimately, the region remains characterised by entrenched enmity, weak integration, and deep external penetration, but with fragile openings for desecuritisation.  

Interregional and Global Dynamics 

The Iran–Saudi rapprochement that began in March of 2023, for which China played a central role in mediating the agreement and is now extending its diplomatic efforts toward Iran and Egypt (Habibi, 2025), highlights the growing penetration of global powers into the ME RSC. While the United States remains a vital security partner for Saudi Arabia, the rapprochement undermines U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran, as shown by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar refusing to support U.S. strikes against ​​Iran, most regional actors see the rapprochement as beneficial to the region as it improves regional stability, economic growth and cooperation in the region ​(Habibi, 2025).​ Iran’s military capacity and nuclear program remain heavily securitised, both by regional rivals and global powers, serving as a recurring justification for continued external involvement ​(International Crisis Group, 2024, p. 8).​ Yet, the fragility of the current Iran–Israel ceasefire underscores the volatility of these dynamics.  

At the interregional level, the Middle East interacts closely with neighbouring security complexes. In ​Regions and Powers​ (2003), Buzan and Wæver described Arab state penetration into Africa as largely one-way. By 2025, however, the Horn of Africa will have become deeply entangled with ME security through Red Sea competition and the Sudanese civil war, while the Sahel has shifted from an insulator zone to a contested frontier where Gulf states, Russia, and China compete for influence ​(Henry, 2025; Salem et al., 2024).​ Egypt’s role as a bridge between complexes has grown in importance, reflecting its reliance on the Nile and ties to Sudan and Ethiopia. South Asia also remains interconnected, as relations among Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran produce shifting patterns of amity and enmity (IISS, 2024). These overlapping spheres demonstrate how domestic instability, regional rivalries, interregional overlaps, and great power penetration together shape the ME RSC, embedding it firmly within global security processes. 

Continuities, Changes, and Future Outlook 

​​​Buzan and Wæver (2003) identified the Arab–Israeli conflict as the core conflict formation of the ME RSC, with the unresolved Palestinian issue perpetuating enmity and enabling continued external penetration (pp. 195-7). Two decades later, this assessment remains valid. The most recent conflict in Gaza has highlighted how Israel’s unresolved dispute with the Palestinians obstructs normalisation with Arab states and reinforces antagonistic patterns. Hostility toward Israel across the region has left governments with little political room to expand ties, despite earlier progress under the Abraham Accords. 

At the same time, notable shifts are evident. The fragile but significant Iran–Saudi rapprochement represents a departure from longstanding hostility, reducing tensions in traditional proxy areas of conflict – Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Likewise, the penetration of global powers into the ME​​ ​RSC has evolved from Cold War bipolarity to multipolar competition involving the United States, Russia, and China, the latter increasingly visible as a mediator and economic partner. In September of 2025, Saudi Arabia and Paki stan signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA), from which China may also benefit, through its close ties with Pakistan, further involving itself in the Gulf and questions of defence cooperation, nuclear energy and strengthening its role as a mediator ​(Calabrese, 2025). Despite this, the power that the United States has through its arms exports in the ME is by far untouchable by other global powers. In the period from 2020 to 2024, half of all major arms imports in countries of the MENA region came from the U.S.; in comparison, only 4% came from Russia, and a little more than 1% came from China ​(Hussain & Dr Tartir, 2025).​ Furthermore, Qatar was at the same time period the top arms importer in the Middle East, and 48% of all the imported arms came from the United States ​(Hussain & Dr Tartir, 2025). While the varied military, economic and diplomatic influence of global powers penetrating the ME RSC often act as destabilising forces by intensifying competition for influence, recent developments also point to an emerging, though uneven, trend toward selective desecuritisation and greater reliance on diplomatic engagement. 

Looking forward, several trajectories are plausible. If regional powers build on cooperative initiatives such as the Iran–Saudi rapprochement or the Abraham Accords, the region could move gradually toward a more inclusive security dialogue framework, mitigating immediate sources of tension and building long-term confidence among regional actors. However, Israeli policies in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria remain a major obstacle. Unless Israel abandons strategies of coercion and unilateral dominance in favour of recognising Palestinian self-determination and pursuing regional consensus, the ​Middle East will remain locked in entrenched rivalry. A middle path​ of​​​​ ​limited diplomacy overshadowed by recurring conflict appears most likely in the near term, leaving the ME as a conflict-driven, externally penetrated security complex where any escalation in one area reverberates regionally. 

 In conclusion, the state of the ME RSC in the years of 2024 through 2025 both confirms and extends Buzan and Waever’s original assessment. The core dynamics they identified, foremost the Arab–Israeli conflict and deep external penetration, remain the structural foundations of the region’s security politics. The most recent conflict in Gaza has entrenched these dynamics further; it continues to obstruct normalisation with Arab states, reproduces antagonistic narratives across the region, and keeps the complex firmly locked in a conflict-formation logic. Despite that, this period has noticeable departures from past patterns, for example, the Iran-Saudi rapprochement, and in general willingness for more significant regional cooperation and diplomacy. Simultaneously, the multipolar penetration of the RSC, now involving the United States, Russia, and China, has altered the external landscape of the region from the Cold War-style patronage to competitive, overlapping engagements that shape regional alignments and constrain local actors. These developments in the dynamic of the RSC most likely will lead to a near-term trajectory of restrained diplomacy, overshadowed by recurrent crises, with partial desecuritisation through cooperation in the region, but prone to periodic escalations along the traditional fault lines. 

The ME RSC remains a conflict-driven and externally penetrated security complex, but it does show the possibility for realigning its dynamic. The balance between entrenched rivalries and new diplomatic initiatives will determine whether the region can transition to a more cooperative regional security ​dynamic or will the dynamic of long-standing conflicts continues to be the defining factor. 

References

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