The Regional Security Monitor is an annual analytical report that tracks and explains security dynamics across global regions, using the Regional Security Complex Theory as conceptualised by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in their book “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.” It offers concise, research-based insights into how threats, actors, and power relations interact within and across regions, revealing both current events and deeper structural patterns shaping regional and international security.
Regional Security Complexes – Western Balkans 2024-2025
by Muhammed Enes Danalıoğlu and Sabina Sali
Introduction
The Western Balkans, comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia, continues to represent a volatile geopolitical region marked by interlinked historical grievances, contested identities, and the intersecting interests of global powers (Harvard International Review 2020). Despite efforts at Euro-Atlantic integration, the region remains shaped by post-Yugoslav fragmentation, ethnic divisions, and enduring institutional weaknesses (Dabrowski & Myachenkova, 2018). These persistent dynamics underscore the relevance of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), which conceptualises regions as distinct systems of interdependent security where threats are primarily generated and managed internally (Buzan & Wæver 2003).
RSCT is particularly applicable to the Western Balkans, where security challenges are intensely regionalised and entangled with both historical legacies and contemporary political developments. The theory enables us to understand the interplay between domestic actors and external powers, the distribution of power within the region, and the cyclical nature of securitisation. The key research question guiding this analysis is: to what extent does the Western Balkans continue to function as a conflict-prone regional security complex, and how have recent events in 2024-2025 influenced its internal and external security dynamics?
By applying RSCT, this analysis explores the Western Balkans as a process-driven regional complex, shaped by layers of historic contestation and geopolitical competition. It will analyse the structure, key actors, and referent objects of the region, assess recent regional developments, examine interregional and global influences, and finally, offer projections on the region’s likely trajectory in light of current trends.
Applying RSCT to the Region
The Western Balkans form a distinct Regional Security Complex (RSC) shaped by historical legacies of empire and nation‐building. As Renan noted, a key principle of nationhood is the collective “rewriting” of history, which Balkan leaders have used to construct national myths and security narratives. After the Ottoman collapse and Yugoslavia’s breakup, each state emerged with its own referent objects, issues seen as vital to survival. For example, Serbia’s security narrative centres on Kosovo and Serb communities, Kosovo Albanians prioritise their new state’s sovereignty, and Bosnia’s constituent entities compete over autonomy versus central state authority. Postwar historiographies often cast “Others” as existential threats, perpetuating ethnic tensions that have blocked NATO and EU integration (Mazower 2000).
RSCT underscores the deep interdependence among Western Balkan states. Political instability in Bosnia or tensions in northern Kosovo often trigger swift regional responses, border patrols, emergency summits, and sharpened rhetoric. This interconnectedness also reflects uneven power: Serbia holds conventional dominance, while others rely on external security umbrellas – Croatia and Albania via NATO, Bosnia via EUFOR, and Kosovo through KFOR. Simultaneously, external powers penetrate the region: Russia and Turkey exert cultural and economic influence, while the EU and the US have intensified engagement since the Ukraine war. The EU, although lacking a military foothold, boosted its defence budget, €343 billion in 2024, and continues to promote enlargement (European Commission 2024). China also projects soft power via Belt-and-Road investments and Confucius Institutes in the Balkans (Harvard International Review 2020).
These dynamics affirm that the Western Balkans operate as a process formation in RSCT terms, a historically constituted and constantly evolving set of security relationships shaped by interaction among domestic, regional, and external actors.
Recent events illustrate these RSCT dynamics. In Serbia, a tragic collapse of a canopy at Novi Sad’s main railway station killed 16 people, triggered mass student-led protests. The protests, which continued into 2025, called for government accountability and justice, framing their demands as part of a wider fight against corruption and institutional negligence (Maksimović & Popović).
In Kosovo, a major political crisis followed the 2025 parliamentary elections. The inability of the winning coalition to form a government within the constitutional deadline led to public frustration and exposed institutional fragility, prompting concerns over political stagnation and legitimacy (Bami & Isufi 2025).
Bosnia and Herzegovina faces a parallel crisis as Republika Srpska’s leadership presses for greater autonomy. In late 2024, RS lawmakers halted EU-integration steps to protest the trial of Republika Srbska leader Dodik, prompting EU and U.S. condemnations as threats to Bosnia’s constitutional order (Radio Free Europe 2024). These cases show how local referent objects – Kosovo’s parliamentary sovereignty, Republika Srpska – autonomy and domestic politics interact with regional stability and global pressures, validating the RSCT perspective.
Regional Security Dynamics in 2024–2025
In 2024 and 2025, the Western Balkans oscillated between moves toward integration and recurring political confrontations. While EU and NATO processes remain active, they coexist with fragile institutions, nationalist rhetoric, and recurring security dilemmas that threaten progress. The region’s security dynamics are shaped less by stability than by sudden escalations, stalled diplomacy, and sustained external influence.
Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo once again dominated headlines and diplomatic agendas. Incidents in northern Kosovo in late 2023 spilt over into 2024, with mutual accusations, local protests, and reactive security deployments. Kosovo authorities also increased the presence of police and special security units in Serb-majority areas, citing threats to public order and the enforcement of constitutional authority (Euronews 2023). Both governments employed the language of existential threat; Serbia framed Kosovo’s actions as hostile to the Serb minority, while Pristina insisted on defending constitutional order (Gadzo, 2024). These reciprocal narratives show how securitisation continues to be a default tool in managing unresolved political disputes (Euronews 2024).
Elsewhere, Republika Srpska’s leadership deepened its challenge to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s central institutions. Early 2025 saw renewed threats of secession and legislative moves to create parallel legal structures. The political message was clear: entity sovereignty is non-negotiable. This stance, met with condemnation from Bosniak and Croat leaders and the international community, keeps Bosnia in a state of institutional gridlock. It also reinforces a core RSCT pattern, regional actors defining their security by opposing the authority or legitimacy of others (Radio Free Europe 2024). However, Milorad Dodik’s stepping down from the position of Republika Srpska President, together with the lifting of U.S. sanctions in late October 2025, underscores the continued and decisive influence of external actors on the fragile peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EWB 2025).
The structure of the region remains complex. Some countries, like Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, have deepened integration into NATO and the EU framework. Others, like Serbia and Bosnia, remain politically fragmented or ambivalent in their strategic orientation. Power is uneven because Serbia holds conventional dominance (Global Fire Power), but this is increasingly balanced by emerging formal alliances. In March 2025, Albania, Kosovo, and Croatia signed the Tirana Declaration on Regional Security, committing to enhanced defence coordination, intelligence exchange, and strategic interoperability (KoSSev 2025). Shortly after, Serbia and Hungary signed a bilateral defence cooperation agreement, widely interpreted as a strategic counterweight, deepening their military and political alignment (Savremena Politika 2025). These agreements signal a move toward bloc-building, with the region coalescing around competing security frameworks shaped by threat perceptions and external alignments.
While the EU continues to push for reforms, backed by funding like the €6 billion Growth Plan, its influence isn’t always persuasive. Many political elites in the region publicly support integration while undermining it behind closed doors. Yet some progress is visible. Regional economic cooperation has improved marginally, and the EU’s conditionality still carries weight.
Ultimately, security in the Western Balkans isn’t static; it’s dynamic, contingent. What happens in one capital ripples across borders. Political actors rely on security rhetoric to mobilise support or deflect criticism. At the same time, external actors, whether from Brussels, Washington, Moscow, or Ankara, step in to mediate, pressure, or reinforce local agendas. The region remains, in RSCT terms, a process formation: not locked in perpetual crisis, but never fully at peace. Integration efforts matter, but they move slowly. Nationalist politics still resonate. The result is a security complex that hovers between fragility and forward motion – a place where progress is real, but always at risk of unravelling.
Interregional and Global Dynamics
The Western Balkans remain deeply embedded in interregional and global security dynamics. Strategically positioned between Eastern Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Central Europe, the region acts as both a buffer and a bridge in broader geopolitical contests. NATO’s enhanced presence, particularly through KFOR and regional military exercises, has linked the Balkans more tightly to Euro-Atlantic security mechanisms. In 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte reaffirmed that “decades of peace must not be jeopardised” (NATO 2025).
EU engagement has deepened through both political dialogue and economic support. The 2024 decision to open accession talks with Bosnia and the launch of the Growth Plan have aimed to anchor reforms, stabilise institutions, and marginalise nationalist agendas. However, EU influence remains asymmetrical, while countries like Albania and North Macedonia embrace reform conditionality, Serbia and Republika Srpska often instrumentalise EU pressure for domestic political gain.
Meanwhile, Russia and China maintain differentiated penetration. Russia supports Republika Srpska and retains soft power in Serbia through media and political networks. China, in contrast, has expanded its influence via infrastructure investments and bilateral economic deals, particularly in Serbia’s mining and energy sectors. These actors challenge Western institutional leverage and offer alternative partnerships that can undercut reform-oriented diplomacy (Harvard International Review 2020).
Turkey, too, has intensified regional engagement, especially through religious and cultural channels in Bosnia and Albania (Ali 2022). The interplay of domestic, regional, interregional, and global forces thus sustains the Western Balkans’ designation as a deeply penetrated, externally conditioned RSC, simultaneously shaped by internal insecurity and competitive international influence.
Many of the Western Balkans’ structural security dynamics remain consistent with the framework outlined by Buzan and Wæver in Regions and Powers. Ethno-territorial disputes, contested sovereignty, and fragmented state institutions continue to define the region. Enduring referent objects, such as Kosovo’s status, the autonomy of Republika Srpska, and unresolved minority rights, remain central to regional securitisation. The persistent absence of mutual trust among regional actors and weak institutional cooperation further reinforce the logic of self-help and suspicion.
Ultimately, the region remains caught between historical patterns of conflict and new impulses for change. Whether the Western Balkans will evolve toward integration or regress into cyclical instability depends on both domestic political will and sustained international engagement.
Continuities, Changes, and Future Outlook
Despite some visible shifts, many of the Western Balkans’ core security patterns remain consistent with the logic outlined in Buzan and Wæver’s Regions and Powers. Longstanding ethno-territorial disputes and state-centred threat perceptions continue to structure the region’s security complex. Foundational referent objects, such as Kosovo’s sovereignty, Republika Srpska’s autonomy, and unresolved minority rights, remain central to regional securitisation.
The region’s alignment dynamics also follow familiar trajectories, with recurring coalitions and rivalries shaped by shared historical narratives and political interests. However, recent years have introduced notable transformations. External powers, including China, Russia, and Turkey, have deepened their engagement, while non-traditional threats, such as disinformation, energy volatility, and climate-related vulnerabilities, have layered additional complexity onto the region’s security architecture.
Climate-induced stress, particularly floods and water scarcity, has increasingly intersected with infrastructural and governance weaknesses, exacerbating insecurity across borders (World Bank, 2024). At the same time, Serbia’s energy dependence on Russian-linked companies, exposed by Western sanctions on the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS), has revealed the region’s strategic exposure to geopolitical disruptions (Beta 2025). These overlapping pressures indicate that the Western Balkans are no longer shaped only by their internal frictions, but by the interplay of global currents and domestic vulnerabilities.
Conclusion
Looking toward 2030, several trajectories remain plausible. One scenario envisions deepening EU integration and the successful resolution of bilateral disputes, gradually stabilising the regional complex. This would affirm Buzan and Wæver’s projection of the Balkans’ long-term absorption into a European security community. However, a more volatile path, marked by democratic backsliding, external interference, or frozen conflicts, could entrench divisions and provoke crisis episodes, especially in Bosnia and between Serbia and Kosovo.
Recent warnings from leaders like Bulgaria’s president, who labelled the region a “critical security fault line,” underscore this precarious balance (Geopost 2025). Ultimately, the Western Balkans are not just a regional concern; they represent a strategic test for broader European and transatlantic stability. As the global order becomes more fluid, the security trajectory of this complex will increasingly reflect and influence international security dynamics writ large.
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