# The Social Capital as a Security Factor

ZORA POPOVA*

*University of Bath, UK*

**Abstract:** The paper focuses on the role of social capital reconstruction after an ethnic conflict, addressing the importance of citizenship (re-)building for the political and economic development. Exploring the lessons learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the paper identifies several levels, at which policy efforts should be directed in order to ensure achievement of expected outcomes. Social capital is a complex mechanism that enables coherence and functioning of any societal system and especially of a state. If elements of social capital do not match, if the macro-level of social capital does not embrace a relevant micro-level, the system is in risk of failure and collapse. When a social capital of a political unit (e.g. state) is in focus, it could be regarded as a security factor. The findings can be applied to assess developments and to evaluate the stability risk in newly emerging states and countries in transition to democracy.

**Keywords:** social capital, citizenship, civil society, security factor, EU-identity

## Introduction

In the early 1990, after the collapse of communism, peoples from the former Eastern bloc emancipated and claimed their rights for political self-identification. As a result, the Balkans faced the most devastating wave of wars after the World War II, which created additional challenges to the transition to democracy, peace and stability.

Twenty years later, the same countries that put an end to the existence of Yugoslavia, are in pursue of policies aiming at accession to the European Union. Surely, this re-union should not be regarded as re-construction of any previously existing model of co-existence, but a construction of a new reality upon a different platform. And the provocative question here is: *Is it possible people who have fought to drive apart to become fellow-EU-citizens and to develop a common EU-identity sharing the same political realm with their former countrymen/rivals? Could the enlarged EU become in such a respect a viable construct?*

The answer is conditionally positive. The feasibility of the project depends on the efforts that would be directed towards enabling the new EU-citizens (since as established by the Treaty of Maastricht 1992, nationals officially acquire EU-citizenship with the accession of their state to the Union) to develop their EU-identity and to transform into community-members. This is a precondition for success in building up a supra-level social capital throughout the EU, which will allow it to continue functioning as a coherent socio-

* *zorapopova@yahoo.com*

political space. Alternatively, a formal 'belonging' to a larger political entity not supported by the establishment of respective system of social capital, is unlikely to result in the development of an overarching identity. With no impetus for integration on this supra-national platform, the political construct would remain void and prone to failures. A lack of shared values and perceptions, of trust and collective goals could impede the process of institution building and the normal operation of the system, becoming even a security challenge in the likely cases of confronting interests.

However odd it might sound, the hypothetical accession of new member states to the EU (especially of states with history of exclusive citizenship rules and practices) resembles the situation that can be observed after an ethnic conflict. Notwithstanding how different are the two environments, they put ordinary people under comparable conditions – people have to find ways to accept a new formal (external) political identity alongside with their personal identity (national, ethnic, etc.). While in both cases the time and effort-consuming macro-framework is much easier to install, the micro-level is not always properly addresses, if at all. And a malfunctioning micro-level puts the whole construct in danger.

Institutional and administrative changes, adjustments of legal frameworks, acquisition of new rights and obligations, implementation of required policies and practices depend on the political will and the functional capacities of states. In the same time, the widening of the political horizon presupposes transformation of perceptions and of the platform of the social relations and community membership. In the post-ethnic conflict situation ethnic-community members (often very hostile to each other) have to 'convert' into nationals. With the EU accession nationals formally acquire EU-citizenship as Community residents but the EU-identity cannot be introduced by the law.

The establishment of respective supra-identity is crucial for the overall success of any political project, where the political community is not achieved in the course of the natural/historical socio-political development but more or less – engineered into the society. The practice however reveals that this task is often left 'for tomorrow' and the instalment of the new principles of social contract, underlying the social capital model, is hardly considered a key element of the institution-building process.

## The Institution of Social Contract

Viewed as an actual or hypothetical compact between ruled and their rulers[1] or as an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for mutual benefit,[2] social contract sets the parameters of any social order, which as a discursive practice, has to be formally introduced and recognised by all community members. As such, it

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1    Encyclopaedia Britannica 2011.

2    Oxford English Dictionary 2011.

is valid only within the limits of the community that has established and accepted the conventions.

Social contracts were constructed during the process of nation-building, embedding and forging the terms of citizenship and political community inclusion into state constitutions, legal systems, and political practices.[3] This has become the basis for building modern identities and relationships contrasting to those of the traditional societies – fixed both along the lines of family and lineage, and along the cultural and economic division of labour. In the form of written constitutions or projected by the political and social institutions of a state, the social contract established the 'internal' configuration of societies, structuring the terms of citizenship and inclusion in a country's political community, the rules of political participation, the relationships of power, the distribution of material resources and the social roles of individuals.[4] The institution of the state has been credited the power to sets the terms of social contract and to protect them.[5]

Institutions play a key role for the maintenance of social contracts and for ensuring the proper functioning of inclusive citizenship rules, which reduce the likelihood of outburst of tensions among different cultural groups and safeguards the representation of the interests of all citizens. Therefore, any transformation they undergo would have a direct impact on social arrangements. Political and economic changes or even the constitution of new identities or opportunities are also likely to challenge the distributions of power and wealth established and institutionalised over time by the social contracts.[6] In such periods of transformation, the existence of adequate regulatory mechanisms could prevent the spread of identity politics. The association of individuals into a new social macro-organism however requires a focused attention, because a new 'general will' that constitutes civil liberty cannot be created as a sum of a number of contesting general wills. The development of an overarching political identity, the construction of supra-citizenship and respective social capital are prerequisites for achieving stability within any new larger political establishment.

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3    Crawford 1998b, 517.

4    Lipschutz 1998, 62.

5    Crawford 1998a, 28. The state in fact has the capacity to determine whether or not a politicised cultural identity would be cemented in social and political practice and whether culturally defined groups would seek autonomy, separatism, or the right to participate with others in the political arena. When political membership and resource distribution are structured according to ascriptive criteria, politicised cultural divisions become legitimate in the political arena and open the floor for political entrepreneurs to mobilise groups for political action. Preferential policies and political institutions are another factor that can intensify or even create political groups, foster identity-based political struggles or introduce biased principles for allocation of benefits. When identity politics dominate political competition, grounds for conflicting claims on resources based on cultural criteria emerge. It is likely that tensions between groups intensify, which would eventually reinforce the importance of ascription as a principle of choice in allocating benefits. If institutions that support the social contract weaken, cultural conflict and violence is likely to occur and eventually affect community structure and function.

6    Lipschutz 1998, 60.

## What is Social Capital?

The concept of social capital can be easily recognised as a product of the 20th century socio-political thought[7]. The numerous theoretical definitions could be viewed under three main categories. The micro-approach to social capital focuses on the value of collective action and on the subjective factors that motivate individuals to cooperate formally (by joining associations) or informally in order to attain certain objectives.[8] Social capital is often associated with trust,[9] shared values,[10] behaviour of the involved actors, norms of reciprocity and successful co-operation in networks of civil engagement, engagement with civic duties.[11]

While micro-level social capital appears as 'cognitive' or as 'the potential of the co-operative strategies (groups, associations, etc.) to strengthen collective capacities',[12] on meso-level it can be referred to as 'structural',[13] taking into account the potential of social networks to produce resources such as information and support.[14] Defining social capital as 'features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit' Putnam[15] distinguishes two different types. While the *bonding social capital,* which appears in relatively homogeneous groups with strong interpersonal ties is a 'sociological super glue'[16] and a mechanism for exclusion, *the bridging social capital* is crucial for development, bringing people together and enabling the establishment of groups in pursue of shared interests. According to Cote and Healy[17] the relationships between individuals and groups in different social strata stemming from the distribution of power and wealth among different groups constitute a third type – *'linking social capital'.*

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7    It appears for the first time as early as 1916 in the Lyda Judson Hanifan's work on the rural school community centres Woolcock 1998, but it was not until the 1990s when the concept came into widespread usage and became a focal point of research and policy discussions. Over a span of 10 years the number of journal articles listing social capital as a key word rose from 109 in 1991–1995 to 1003 in March 1999 Baum 2000 quoted in UKONS 2001, 6. The subsequent application of the concept in a range of social issues has dissolved its empirical specificity into a fashionable word meaning all things to all people UKONS 2001, 6; Woolcock 2001.

8    Franke 2005, 2.

9    Woolcock 2001.

10    Cote and Healy 2001.

11    Fukuyama 1995, 151–153.

12    Franke 2005, 2.

13    Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001.

14    Portes 1998.

15    Putnam et al. 1993, 36.

16    Putnam 2000, 19.

17    Cote and Healy 2001, 42.

From a sociological perspective Coleman[18] examines social capital as obligations and expectations, flow of information, and presence of norms. Michael Woolcock[19] regards social capital as incorporating four dimensions of inter-community relationships,[20] while Uphoff[21] focuses on the type of these relationships (structural or cognitive) and on their level of interaction (vertical or horizontal).[22] Examining the structures that enable co-operation, the meso-approach endues instrumental value to social capital and takes for its determinants the social networks and the types of interactions within and among them. As a resource/product emerging from the horizontal and vertical social ties,[23] social capital appears neither an individual nor a collective property (benefit), but both.

The macro-approach to social capital looks upon the environmental, social, and political structures that enable or impede social engagement and civic and political participation[24] (such as government, legislation, markets, development actors, institutional environment and even culture[25]). As a product of these structures and thus a collective benefit,[26] social capital is seen as dependant upon the willingness of the individuals to be involved in civic life and on the trust and reciprocity inspired by the institutions.

The rising awareness of social capital as an interactive system of elements has resulted in the elaboration of complex theoretical models encompassing the different dimensions and manifestations of the notion. The Social Capital Assessment Tool[27] (or SCAT – Figure 1), has been developed from qualitative and quantitative data and research instruments derived from 26 studies in 15 countries worldwide. This analytical framework identifies some broad but constant categories but accepts that the precise selection of sub-categories would be context-specific.[28]

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18    Coleman 1988; 1990.

19    Woolcock 1998.

20    According to Woolcock 1998 these are: strong ties between family members and neighbours; weak ties with the outside community and between communities; formal institutions including laws and norms; and state-community interaction.

21    Uphoff 2000.

22    Social capital is an 'accumulation of various types of social, psychological, cognitive, institutional, and related assets that increase the amount of probability of mutual beneficial co-operative behaviour that is productive for others, not just one's self', Uphoff 2000, 216.

23    Bourdieu 1986, 248–249, Portes 1998.

24    Franke 2005, 2.

25    Colletta and Cullen 2000, 11; North 1990; Olson 1982.

26    Putnam 2001.

27    Krishna and Shrader 1999.

28    What constitutes social capital in one context might be unsocial in another Krishna and Shrader 1999, 6.

**Figure 1:** *SCAT conceptual framework: levels and types of social capital*
*Source: Krishna & Shrader 1999*

The conceptual framework of Grootaert and van Bastelaer[29] incorporates a number of earlier theoretical findings[30] and reveals the simultaneous manifestation of social capital at different levels and in variety of forms through a four-dimensional co-ordination system (Figure 2). Engaging with Uphoff's theory, the *structural social capital* is considered a relatively objective and observable construct based on established roles, social networks and structures supplemented by rules, procedures, and precedents, while the *cognitive social capital* referring to shared norms and values, appears a more subjective and intangible concept.[31] The two forms of social capital can be complementary but not necessarily interdependent – personal cognitive bonds **might not** develop into structural social capital, such as the existence of community associations **does not imply** strong interpersonal relations among its members. Social interaction however could promote a basis for constitution of social capital through the persistence of its effects at either or both levels.[32]

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29    Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001.

30    *E.g. Olson 1982, Coleman 1988, Putnam 1993a, Fukuyama 1995, Uphoff 1996.*

31    Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001, 6.

32    Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001, 7.

Macro

Institutions of the state,
rule of law

Governance

Structural ———————————|——————————— Cognitive

Local intitutions,
networks

Trust,
local norms, and values

Micro

*Figure 2: Grootaert & van Bastelaer's Model of Social Capital*
*Source: Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001*

As the two models suggest, all the elements within the construct are functionally connected. The coherence of the system depends on the compatibility and the commensurability of its elements with the macro-level. The macro-unit determines the scope of the matrix and of all the encompassed elements. From this point of view, if the goal of the reconstruction process is the (re-)establishment of a stable and prosperous state, all the elements in the matrix have to correspond to the 'state'. The macro-cognitive element of governance would imply 'state governance'; the micro-structural element of local institutions and networks would be congruent with those existing at the national (state) level, and the micro-cognitive trust and local norms and values should sustain an understanding of the people as citizens, i.e. state-members. If the macro-framework is the European Union as a political realm, then at micro-level we should search for EU-networks, for local institutions at EU-regional level (not necessarily corresponding to the national administrative division) and for EU-citizenship norms and values (acquired by the members of all national communities). The same principle also applies to the SCAT matrix.

## Why Social Capital Can Be Viewed as a Security Factor?

The two complex models of social capital reveal that functional balance within an observed unit (political, territorial, institutional, etc.) could be achieved only if the elements of the system are complementary to each other and connected in a dynamic equilibrium. Alternatively, it is very likely that the social 'machine' would not be able to operate properly and eventually a failure would occur. Depending on the specific socio-political, economic or cultural context, such a failure could have dramatic consequences. Hence, an imbalanced system with a macro- and micro-levels in conflict is a security challenge. The case of the post-ethnic-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina projected through the adapted model of Grootaert and van Bastelaer of social capital provides the clarifying example (Figure 3).[33]

The macro-structural level corresponds to the internationally recognised political unit.[34] The macro-cognitive level of governance refers to the state governance, but in the post-conflict environment it could easily be viewed as the governance performed by the international community and institutions. National governance, as perceived both from outside and from within the state, often lacks legitimacy, capacities and power to move the process in a desired direction.



***Figure 3:*** *Structure of social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina*
*Source: Popova 2009*

33    Since the number of politically determined communities can multiply the mirrored sections, the distorted levels cannot be well visualised by the SCAT model Figure 4, yet valid if applied.

34    In the particular case this is the State of BiH, but the model can be also applied to a 'preserved' political unit emerging from an ethnic conflict Rwanda, or a region with a special after-war status former status of Kosovo.

Real governance in the case of a fragmented and war-traumatised society rests with local networks and institutions, i.e. at the micro-structural level. These local structures limited to the particular community are constituted upon exclusive bonding ties that restrict membership. The different local (ethnic) networks and institutions do not seek interaction and quite often are hostile to each other. In this context, trust and norms at the micro-cognitive level are present only among the members of each 'community' and not across the members of the different groups. The state becomes an abstract and 'hostile' entity, run by foreigners through their local 'puppets'. This lack of trust in the institutions of the state prevents the emergence of any affiliations with the state. A counterpoint of the state appears the super-ethnic structure – the dream of a homogeneous national state, powered by the governance of myths and ethnic ideologies that political entrepreneurs use for their purposes.

In this light, a major mistake in the process of reconstruction is the presumption that once the formal state institutions are restored, the state-machine will start functioning immediately. In the case of an engineered political unit (regardless whether this is an imposed statehood or formal union membership), the latter is more likely to reinforce existing community identities if people have not developed new overarching identities. If there is no micro-level affiliated with the macro-level of the new political structure, it is more likely that it be populated by 'inhabitants' rather than citizens.



*Figure 4: Social capital of a divided society (SCAT model adapted)*

In a post-ethnic conflict environment, any efforts that require involvement of citizens and civil society at the level of state are more likely to fail; and people who feel forced to live together is likely to continue their attempts to drive apart. Therefore a crucial factor for ensuring development and stability of the new formation is the establishment of proper bridging ties – to enable social cohesion, and the investments in linking state-level social capital made. Only after ethnic/national community members would have the chance to start identifying themselves as citizens of the larger political.

## The EU Perspective or What Can Be Done?

The example with post-conflict BiH illustrates the negative prospective before any construct that ignores the importance of the micro-level of social capital. Although the practice reveals that success can be achieved at macro-structural level (institutions, legislation, procedures, etc.), a weak or missing micro-level could impede progress and hamper the viability of any macro-system as a whole. In the case of Bulgaria for example, the country has formally introduced all the structures, mechanisms and instruments required for an EU member state. But problems are visible yet on macro-cognitive level – the rule of law and its implementation has not exactly reached the EU efficiency, corruption is still a major challenge, and the standards of governance fall behind those of the EU.

The development of micro-level EU-social capital (both structural and cognitive) is connected to the issue of building of EU-identity, the importance of which has been recognised at the highest political levels of the Union. While the 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the EU-citizenship as a formal attribute to all nationals of the member-states, reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty,[35] the EU-identity is far more floating concept and a challenging project.

Building upon the idea of free movement across national borders (set out in the Treaty of Rome 1957), the Maastricht Treaty has defined the citizenship as based on a number of rights. Four rights are open to all EU-citizens: the right to move and reside within EU territory; the right to vote and stand for election at the local and European level in any member state; the right to protection from the diplomatic authorities of any member state when travelling outside the EU, and the right to petition the European Parliament. The Flash Eurobarometer Survey on European Union Citizenship[36] (N 294), commissioned by the European Commission and conducted in 2010 in the 27 member states, revealed that although a significant majority claims familiarity with the term "citizen of the European Union" (79%), only 32% of respondents consider themselves well informed about their rights as citizens of the European Union. Although 90% of the people are aware that they are both citizens of the EU and (nationality) at the same time, about 20% of the interviewed had no clear understanding of the automatic acquisition EU-citizenship. About 68% were familiar with the newly established (by the Treaty of Lisbon) "Citizens initiative" right – a request signed by at least 1 million EU citizens inviting the EC to propose a new policy measure.

Nevertheless of significant importance, the normative framework could serve as a basis but does not have the capacity to forge a unified European identity. To support this processes, the EU has tried to institutionalise the symbols of the EU – the European flag and anthem – in the failed Constitution (2004), but later in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) there was no specific reference to them.

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35    Lisbon Treaty 2007, Title II, Article 8.

36    Eurobarometer 2010.

Since the supranational EU-identity (as officially established) does not aim to substitute for national or regional identities, the natural development of this feeling for belonging could occur very slowly, if not supported. Since 1992 the standard Eurobarometer survey regularly approaches respondents with the "feeling European" question. The table below clearly shows that for the last almost 20 years there is no significant change in the attitudes, not to point out the negative trends.

| Date | (Nationality) only | (Nationality) & European | European & (Nationality) | European only | Don't know |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 04/1992 | 38% | 48% | 6% | 4% | 4% |
| 11/1993 | 40% | 45% | 7% | 4% | 3% |
| 12/1994 | 33% | 46% | 10% | 7% | 4% |
| 06/1995 | 37% | 45% | 8% | 6% | 3% |
| 12/1995 | 40% | 46% | 6% | 5% | 3% |
| 11/1996 | 46% | 40% | 6% | 5% | 3% |
| 04/1997 | 45% | 40% | 6% | 5% | 4% |
| 05/1998 | 44% | 41% | 6% | 5% | 4% |
| 11/1998 | 43% | 43% | 7% | 4% | 2% |
| 11/1999 | 45% | 42% | 6% | 4% | 3% |
| 06/2000 | 41% | 45% | 7% | 4% | 2% |
| 01/2001 | 38% | 49% | 6% | 3% | 3% |
| 11/2001 | 44% | 44% | 6% | 3% | 3% |
| 11/2003 | 39.80% | 46.90% | 7.10% | 3.30% | 2.90% |
| 04/2004 | 41% | 46% | 6% | 4% | 3% |
| 10/2004 | 41% | 47% | 7% | 3% | 2% |
| 10/2005 | 41% | 48% | 7% | 2% | 2% |
| 06/2010 | 46% | 41% | 7% | 3% | 2% |

*Table 1: "In the near future do you see yourself as...?" – EU average*
*Source: European Union, 1995–2010 (based on Eurobarometer surveys 1992–2010)*

Generating trust, shared values and common interests as a crosscutting EU-elements is time- and effort-consuming process with rather arguable outcomes. Leaving the Euro-scepticism aside, one could hardly spot any concerns about the financial stability of the Euro-zone among the Greeks protesting for their nationally acquired social rights. In the same time EU-voting often appears connected with national dynamics rather than with the EU-policy and strategic priorities. The Euro-regions project is still an underdeveloped project and hardly with essential impact on national policies and processes throughout Europe. If the ***concern about the fellow-Europeans*** can be taken as a marker for the level of micro-cognitive social capital of the EU, the situation can hardly be defined as positive (see map below). The Atlas of European Values, published in 2005 and based on

the European Values Surveys,[37] suggests that although nationals of member states share values related to the rights, labour, quality of life, there are great differences concerning family, religion, attitudes, trust, etc. This means that the EU micro-level of social capital is rather fragmented and that efforts are need to integrate people on the basis of their identity as Europeans. The map below illustrates this conclusions by revealing that the highest level of concern about the fellow-Europeans from other nations scores 3.06 (on the scale between (1) "very much" and (5) "not at all"). In fact, as the conducted value survey indicates (EVS 2004) ***respect for diversity*** appears among the few overarching values shared by the great majority of Europeans.



***Figure 5***
*Source: www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu*

The development of the micro-level of social capital (both cognitive and positive), which refers to the establishment not only of local level institutions but also to the development of shared norms, values, and trust is a challenging endeavour. A stable and prosperous

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37    The European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values. It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens all over Europe. It is a unique research project on how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics and society. The first survey was conducted in 1981, followed by three others in 1990, 1999 and 2008. The fourth wave in 2008 covers no less than 47 European countries/regions, from Iceland to Azerbaijan and from Portugal to Norway. In total, about 70,000 people in Europe are interviewed.

heterogeneous political unit could be viable only if there is a functioning system of social capital. To achieve this goal it is essential that the elements in all of the four quadrants (Figure 2) are of corresponding scope. A micro-level based on a functioning civil social contract could become a driver of positive processes. The macro-unit can determine the appropriate strategies and actions and would provide with the tools for their implementation, but would not necessarily bring along the needed micro-level. After an ethnic conflict the establishment of a civil and democratic state requires a focussed attention on the elements and the processes at the micro-level (with the macro-level used as a point of reference). The stability of the future enlarged EU is also dependant on the investments in the creation of the needed micro-EU-social capital.

Building social capital in this context means enabling co-operation among people and creating an environment where tolerance and will for co-operation could emerge from the interests in common future as a shared good. This would also provide grounds for cohesion and the development of social capital at the level of the desired outcomes.[38] In this respect, civic education has a significant potential to enable development and enhancement of European social contract and the supra-national (European) level of social capital by promoting nested identities and inclusive political membership.

The findings based on the comparison between the theoretical approaches and the empirical evidences from the case study of reconstruction of social capital in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina[39] were synthesised in a table to present the different levels, elements and goals that should be taken into account to design a comprehensive strategy aiming at positive outcomes. Table 2 outlines the areas, within which the post-conflict policies and programmes (aiming at creating enabling conditions for social integration) should plan, design, and eventually complete their activities. Acknowledging that social capital building can be more successful if efforts are focused on improving its structure,[40] the elements that constitute the grid of the concept for each of the four dimensions are placed in the first column. The second column considers the mechanisms that could contribute to the reconstruction of the respective elements, while the provisional outcomes resulting from the implementation of the prescribed activities are placed in the third column. This model is easily adaptable for assessing the needs and identifying the possible steps towards enhancement of EU-social capital.

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38    Colletta and Cullen 2000, 132.

39    Popova 2009.

40    Stone 2001.

## Conclusion

Different studies attribute different functions to social capital. Some forms may contribute to social cohesion, while others are more likely to spur social fragmentation; some can be a source of mutual aid and protection, others simply enable the mobilisation for violence.[41] All of the approaches however share the idea that by bridging and mitigating exclusive relations, social capital can prevent conflicts and facilitate collective action and achievement of desired outcomes. It has the capacity to motivate individuals to work together, because the end-result is seen not only as a 'common good', but also as a 'personal benefit'. Having the potential to enable development and to assist in overcoming problems, social capital is a change-generating mechanism[42] and can improve quality of life. It can mobilise resources and distribute them within society, bring about greater safety, social inclusion and economic participation, or substitute for state and market failures.[43]

Context dependent, it is by no means a panacea and exclusively a societal good.[44] Development of social capital can bring about specific advantages and instruments for achieving policy–related objectives, such as increasing stocks of human and financial capital.[45] Civic engagement resulting from strong and functioning social capital can strengthen state institutions,[46] while weak, hostile, or indifferent governments have a different effect on community life.[47]

Social capital is not a static construct, but a living system, open to changes and transformations, as well as to 'interventions from outside'. Engineering of social capital can be successful, only if the process is planned and implemented with respect to cultural, social, and other specificities, and provided that submerged norms and practices of trust are engaged in the process.[48]

41    Colletta and Cullen 2000, 93.

42    Bayat 2005, 2.

43    Colletta and Cullen 2000, 93.

44    Woolcock 2001.

45    Schuller 2001.

46    Feldman and Assaf 1999, 4.

47    Woolcock and Narayan 2000, 226; Narayan 1999.

48    Durston 1998.

| ELEMENTS | MECHANISMS TO ENABLE SOCIAL CAPITAL (RE-) CONSTRUCTION | SOCIAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION GOALS |
|---|---|---|
| **MACRO-STRUCTURAL (NATIONAL LEVEL BRIDGING TIES)** | | |
| • Institutions of state<br>• Rule of law | • Transparent, accessible, and accountable national institutions<br>• External assistance and support with respect to local needs<br>• Justice and security for all<br>• Fair distribution of resources on formal (non-ethnic) principles | • Inter-ethnic relations regulated by formal/civil principles and rules<br>• Law and institutions safeguarding equality and non-discrimination;<br>• Civil rights and freedoms ensured; suppressed identity politics<br>• Enabled economic & social development |
| **MACRO-COGNITIVE (NATIONAL LEVEL BONDING TIES)** | | |
| • Governance<br>• Democratic institutions: inclusive citizenship, participation rules, etc.<br>• Inclusive politics<br>• Common knowledge base & value system | • Implementation of democratic practices and values - equal access to power & services, fair distribution of resources, political representation; development of state–community relationships<br>• De-politisation of ethnic/cultural differences<br>• National educational policy (common curriculum); National communication, media & information policy; 'National' reconciliation policy | • Trust in state institutions and support for governmental policies<br>• Active participation in elections<br>• Objective & supportive to integration media<br>• Common knowledge & value base<br>• Overcoming of prejudices and hatreds, opening of mindsets<br>• Reconciling with the past<br>• Visions for common future |
| **MICRO-STRUCTURAL (LOCAL LEVEL BRIDGING TIES)** | | |
| • Local institutions<br>• Local level networks & associations | • Community development in line with inclusive national agenda - non-discriminatory politics, integrative practices, non-discriminatory policies,<br>• Transparent & accessible institutions; equal distribution of resources<br>• Participation in local governance open to all communities<br>• Support for local, supra-ethnic initiatives solving community problems<br>• Support for inter-communal cooperation & interaction<br>• Support to formal associations, interest groups, inter-community networks and groupings | • Raising trust in local institutions & in the state in general<br>• Interaction and communication within & between communities<br>• Development of supra-ethnic bridging ties & cross-cutting relations & interdependence<br>• Community problems becoming individual concerns<br>• Transfer of ownership of processes, activities, and responsibilities - active citizenship enabled<br>• Development of nested identities & multiple loyalties |
| **MICRO-COGNITIVE (LOCAL LEVEL BONDING TIES)** | | |
| • Trust, values & norms<br>• Relations, attitudes, stereotypes & prejudices<br>• Will for cooperation<br>• Individual self-perception: affiliation with a supra-ethnic national community, active citizenship, Multiple nested identities<br>• "shaping the future" | • Civil social contract recognised by all (equality & rights) - new values & norms introduced through existing networks; promotion of inclusive national identities (supportive media)<br>• Interaction between groups; inter-group & inter-cultural communication<br>• Identification of common interests and problems; involvement into reconstruction practices; transfer of ownership of processes; incentives for common future – e.g. membership in international organisations; Reconciliation programs<br>• Creation of community (nation) feelings through sport/culture/others<br>• Education – common knowledge base, overcome prejudices, open mindsets<br>• Integration and networking programs for youngsters | • (Re)construction of citizenship and civil affiliations; empowerment of individuals as citizens – feeling for control over the institutions & of security; motivated participation in public processes<br>• Community feelings developed (affiliation with larger/national community)<br>• (Re-)emergence of trust & will for cooperation, of tolerance and respect for diversity; overcoming of negative stereotypes & prejudices<br>• Creation of 'nested' identities & multiple loyalties<br>• Will for integration and cooperation, personal involvement with common problems & future<br>• Individual appeasement with the past; overcoming trauma<br>• Interaction and development of trust among the youngsters |

*Table 2: social capital framework*

Favourable conditions of the changing environment should be used to promote and enable the resurgence of social capital and to raise the awareness of any negative factors that might hamper the process.

Building up structures on meso- and macro-level is a necessary action, but it cannot be successful if it lacks the stable basis of a respective micro-level, which cannot be imported, transformed instantly, or imposed from outside. It should be nourished and enabled to emerge and develop. Among the most important resource for generating constructive organisational change or improvement however is the individuals' vision and expectations about the future. The prospects for an attractive common future can guide persons and organisations, mobilise support and/or action. The establishment of an integrative environment however would occur only if individuals perceive themselves as members of a single society with compatible visions and interest in the common living. These are challenges before the EU not only with regard to the future enlargement, but also with regard to the stability and the lasting viability of the current political construct.

A challenge that the enlarged European Union has to face, especially in the light of the provisioned membership of the countries from the Western Balkans, is to address more actively the need for building up the common supra-identity of the European citizens, supported by the respective system of elements of social capital.

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