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Correction: "The Nordic Region: Can Russia *Divide and Rule*? Four Russo-Nordic Relations After Crimea and Trump", (2019, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 101–128)

Abstract: Due to the error in the transmission of files in the layout process, a different version of the text had been published from the present one that was provided by the author and approved by the Editors. The Editors would like to apologize for this technical mistake to the author and to the readers. We acknowledge that the version that the author sent to the Journal of 14 September is the correct one, and that there are the following minor revisions that need to be made to the version of the article that had been firstly published in *Journal of Regional Security* Vol. 14, No. 2. The list of corrections shall be published in Journal of Regional Security Vol. 15, No. 1 both, in print and online. The corrected article shall be published online, replacing the file previously published within Vol. 14, No. 2 in print and online.

The following corrections shall be made:

1. p. 101: the * is added to the title of the article, as well as the following footnote:

With the permission of the editors of *Internasjonal Politikk*, the present article is a slight revision and translation of "Fire nordiske Ruslands-relationer. På vej mod en fællesnordisk Ruslands-politik efter Krim og Trump?" by the same author (2019) in IP 77(3): 1–25.

2. p. 102: the former subtitle, **Great Power Wedging as a Theoretical Perspective** shall now read **Great Power Wedging as a Machiavellian Perspective**.

3. p. 103, second paragraph beginning with "As opposed to..." shall read:

As opposed to long-term rearmament processes, for instance, day-to-day geopolitics is to a large extent about two interrelated things: (1) the Machiavellian ambition to exploit, or even create, wedges between states in an opposed alliance/group of states, and correspondingly (2) to pre-empt or camouflage any such wedges in one's own camp. The latter is done through statements of unity and mutual solidarity, like the above op-ed by Nordic defence ministers, possibly combined with actual deeds to enhance the statements' credibility. The same 'wedge game' can be found at all levels of politics, presumably, for

instance as a government seeks to split its parliamentary opposition or vice versa. So, there is nothing unique about the phenomenon, also known as 'divide-and-rule,'¹ in the present context. Still, it is curiously under researched in modern IR.² Historians refer to it, journalists do, and politicians ascribe it to their opponents.

In the first sentence of the paragraph, the word "Machiavellian" is inserted. After "mutual solidarity", the part "like the above op-ed by Nordic defence ministers" is inserted. The last two sentences in the paragraph, beginning with "Still, it is..." are being inserted.

Also, from the same paragraph, the following sentence is being deleted: "Nonetheless, it is obviously part of the Nordic blame game against Russia in the above op-ed that its 'propaganda' allegedly 'sows discord between countries."

4. p. 103: the changes in pt. 3 resulted in the changes to the footnotes 5 and 6 (see also below):

Footnote 5 shall now read: Cf., e.g., Crawford 2011; Nexon 2009; Posner *et al.* 2009; or Wigell and Vihma 2016.

Footnote 6 shall now read: As formulated by Crawford 2008: "I have not found a book or article in the field of international relations that makes wedge strategy in general a central concern" (note 3).

5. p. 118: the footnotes 53 and 53 shall be corrected.

Footnote 53 shall now read: Udenrigsministeriet (Danmark) 2017.

Footnote 54 shall now read: Udenrigsministeriet (Danmark) 2019.

This change above also results in the changes to the list of references:

On p. 128, the reference Udenrigsministeriet. 2019. ... shall now read Udenrigsministeriet (Danmark). 2019. ...

On p. 128, the reference Udenrigspolitik 2017. ... shall now read Udenrigsministeriet (Danmark). 2017. ...

6. p. 123: in the sentence ending with "of common history", the new footnote 72 is added, and it shall read:

¹ Cf., e.g., Crawford 2011; Nexon 2009; Posner et al. 2009; or Wigell and Vihma 2016.

² As formulated by Crawford 2008: "I have not found a book or article in the field of international relations that makes wedge strategy in general a central concern" (note 3).

Also, Russia's "differentiated approach [here: wedging] to the Baltic states is rooted in the justifiable conclusion that Baltic unity is more myth than reality and that the Baltic countries are competitors rather than partners, especially in economic matters." Stranga 1996, 160.

7. p. 124: In the list of references add the new reference:

Crawford, Timothy. 2008. "Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940–41". *Security Studies* 17 (1): 1–38.

p. 127: in the list of references add the new reference: Stranga, Aivars. 1996. "Russia and the Security of the Baltic States: 1991–1996". In The Baltic States' Search for Security, edited by Atis Lejins, and Daina Bleiere, 141–86. Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs.